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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the political economy of employment polarization 
focusing on the implications of this phenomenon along three main research 
fronts. The first paper follows a methodology which resembles closely the 
one adopted by Goos, Manning and Salomons (2014), however it further 
extends this framework by testing the joint effect of routinization and labour 
market institutions on employment structures. The evidence provided 
suggests that the claim of a pervasive technology-induced polarization 
should be revised in order to comprise a role for the institutional component. 
The second paper explores whether job polarization has a feedback effect on 
labour market institutions and policies, so that different degrees of 
polarization lead to different articulations of institutions at the domestic 
level, thus reinforcing or altering differences in national models across the 
European space. The analysis finds that the job polarization experienced by a 
particular country in the 5 years before a reform instance is consistently 
among the strongest predictors of reform activity, as significant as other 
drivers such as GDP growth and government net debt. Moreover, a higher 
degree of polarization tends to be associated with more deregulation and a 
decrease in the generosity of the policy measure. The empirical framework is 
also tested against more conventional taxonomies of welfare capitalism 
revealing that LMEs tend to harness job polarization dynamics whereas 
CMEs are incompatible with job polarization which destabilizes the system 
leading to an increased need for reforms. The final paper asks whether the 
U-shaped impact on the wage distribution predicted by the job polarization 
literature has actually materialized in Europe. The findings show that job 
polarization increased upper-tail inequality (90/50) and decreased lower-tail 
(50/10) inequality but that employment protection legislation restrained the 
wage effects.  
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INTRODUCTION 
We are being afflicted with a new disease of which some readers may not yet have heard the 
name, but of which they will hear a great deal in the years to come - namely, technological 
unemployment. This means unemployment due to our discovery of means of economising 
the use of labour outrunning the pace at which we can find new uses for labour. 
 
But this is only a temporary phase of maladjustment. All this means in the long run that 
mankind is solving its economic problem. I would predict that the standard of life in 
progressive countries one hundred years hence will be between four and eight times as high 
as it is to-day. There would be nothing surprising in this even in the light of our present 
knowledge. It would not be foolish to contemplate the possibility of afar greater progress still. 
 
John Maynard Keynes 
                                      Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren (1930) 
 
 
1. Motivation and Broader Relevance 
Over the last years innovation has gained a central stage in both the 
academic and public debate. On one side of the spectrum we have 
researchers who claim that the era of big innovation is over and economic 
growth could slow dramatically as a result. On the opposite side we find 
those who are convinced that innovation is far from over and that instead 
“we are simply feeling the growing pains of a shift from an economy based 
on production to one based on ideas” (TED 2013, Long Beach Conference). In 
his latest book The Future, Al Gore asserts, “the Luddites, who feared that the 
Industrial Revolution would create structural unemployment, were wrong. 
The new jobs that emerged in factories not only outnumbered those lost on 
farms but produced higher incomes, even as farms became far more 
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productive and food prices sharply declined. Yet there is no guarantee 
history will repeat itself”. He is not alone in raising concerns over the 
implications for the labour force and the broader society of the rapid 
technological innovation, which is transforming our civilization into a robot 
economy. Robert Gordon, at Northwestern University in his Beyond the 
Rainbow, in which the economist discusses the evolution of the standards of 
living in the US, depicts a very gloomy picture for the next decades. He 
claims that we have reached the end of progress, the digital economy does 
not have the same multiplier effect of the industrial revolution, and the last 
great innovations belong to the mid twentieth century: “shifting from 
10km/h of a horse to 900 of a Boeing is a unique episode in history”. He 
questions Solow’s assumption of permanent economic growth and affirms 
that the frontier growth rate could indeed decline. The more “optimistic” 
side is instead represented by E. Brynjolfsson and A.McAfee at MIT who 
believe that technological creativity is having an unprecedented impact on 
our lives and that this will continue to accelerate in the coming years. 
However as already hinted at in the title of their bestseller Race Against the 
Machine, the technological revolution has genetically modified our society 
destroying more jobs than it creates: “A lot of economists felt that as long as 
productivity was growing, things would take care of themselves. That’s no 
longer true”. In the last decades we have observed a gradual decoupling of 
wages from productivity, which has widened inequality and although new 
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markets have been created this has mainly benefited innovators, investors 
and consumers to the detriment of workers.  This has highlighted what can 
be considered “one the most puzzling aspects of the modern economy: why 
so much technological creativity can co-exist with stagnating wages and 
mass unemployment” (The Economist, May 2013).  
The recent dispute over the third industrial revolution (computers, mobile 
phones, the web) and its repercussions on the global labour force had 
already been extensively investigated in 1995, when Jeremy Rifkin in his The 
End of Work pointed out that in the decades to come the most pressing 
concern facing society would be represented by rethinking the very nature of 
work. In the last chapter of his book he puts forward several proposals, from 
reengineering the work week to a new social contract that in his view would 
allow us to adapt to the new reality and capture the gains of this 
technological revolution without creating unsustainable social trauma. But, 
as it was written in The Economist May 2013 Schumpeter editorial, are we 
condemned to live in a Vonnegut’s dystopia in which both our brain work 
and manual work are taken over by machines? Also, is the middle class 
doomed to disappearance as provokingly suggested in a public interview at 
the World Economic Forum in Davos, in January 2013, by Larry Summers 
who said: “as economists like to explain, the system will equilibrate at full 
employment. But maybe the way it will equilibrate at full employment is 
13 
 
there’ll be specialists at cleaning the shallow end and the deep end of rich 
people’s swimming pools.”  
 
2. A Literature Review on Job Polarization 
The prediction of Skill Biased Technical Change (SBTC) involves a shift in 
employment of a uniform nature, moving away from low-skilled jobs 
towards high-skilled occupations. Nevertheless, studies for the US and the 
UK have demonstrated that there exists a growth in employment in both the 
highest-skilled (managerial and professional) occupations as well as in the 
lowest-skilled (personal services) jobs, with a deterioration of employment in 
the middle of the distribution (manufacturing and routing office jobs). Goos, 
Manning, Salomons (2009) thus define job polarization as an increase in 
high-paid and low-paid employment and a relative decline in middle-paid 
occupations. Their study puts forward three main hypotheses as 
explanations for the phenomenon of job polarization: 
- Routinization: the progress of technology has the effect of replacing 
“routing” labour –which often involves clerical tasks– and crafting 
jobs in the middle of the wage distribution (Autor, Levy, Murnane, 
2003, hereafter ALM).  
- Globalization-Offshoring: in the richest nations, this is an important 
source of change in the job structure (Blinder 2007). 
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- Wage inequality: the rise in the share of income that goes to the rich 
sector of the population may have caused a rise in the demand for 
low-skill workers, whose employment progressively amount to the 
provision of services to the rich (Manning 2004, Mazzolari and Ragusa 
2007). 
The authors aimed to discern the prevalence of the phenomenon of job 
polarization, and understand in particular whether it is confined to Anglo-
Saxon economies, which at the top of the wage distribution have had very 
significant increases in wage inequality. In this regard, a review of 
preliminary evidence coming from West Germany indicates that job 
polarization is also taking place there. The query that follows, appropriately, 
is whether the phenomenon occurs in other European nations that have 
undergone similar technological changes but have not experienced the same 
trajectory in terms of wage inequality generally. For this inquiry, the data 
utilised was the harmonized European Union labour force Survey (ELFS), 
supplemented by German data from social security records (IABS), which 
was used to map occupational employment changes in sixteen European 
countries for the 1993-2006 period. Occupations, in turn, were classified by 
the 21 two-digit International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO), 
and employment was considered as weekly hours worked but identical 
results with number of persons employed. Furthermore, ISCO occupations 
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were ordered by 1993 mean European wage rank (employment pooled in 
occupation-industry cells across the sixteen countries), and jobs were 
considered as industry-occupation cells weighted by their 1993 employment 
shares, pooled across countries, and finally ranked by their UK 1994 log 
mean wage. The results of this analysis showed that low-paying and high-
paying jobs expand their employment shares by 6 and 2 percentage points, 
respectively. The middling occupations, however, show a decrease of their 
employment share of 8 percentage points. Regarding routinization, 96 
variables from the US Occupation Information Network (O*NET) database 
were used for the construction of the following three measures:  
- abstract tasks (intense in non-routine cognitive skills)  high-paid 
service jobs 
- service tasks (intense in non-routine non-cognitive skills)  low-paid 
service jobs 
- routine tasks (intense in both cognitive and non-cognitive routine 
skills)  middling jobs 
As for off-shoring, counts of news reports concerning the offshoring of 
European jobs from the European Restructuring Monitor indicated that 
routine occupations are most often offshored. Still, it is discernable that some 
non-routine jobs are much more offshorable than others. For the analysis of 
wage inequality, data for each of the countries from the European Union 
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Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP), as well as the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) was used to establish 
measures of wage inequality as well as time-varying measures of occupation 
wages. The expectation was that countries with compressed occupational 
wage distributions would have a relatively modest portion of employment in 
low-wage jobs given that relative wages affect factor demands – and not 
least because inequality in general has a positive effect on the demand for 
low-skill workers through the demand of the rich for the provision of 
personal services. Nevertheless, results showed that there was no cross-
sectional link of significance between the structure of employment and wage 
inequality. In fact, in the four lowest-paying occupations, overall wage 
inequality (log(p90/p10)) was not positively correlated with the share of 
employment in any remarkable manner.  A question that lingers, still, is 
whether there may be a relationship between changes in wage inequality 
and changes in the structure of employment through a series of regressions 
that apply the above-mentioned factors to a linear time trend in order to 
model the idea of a process, with the results of changes in technology being 
assumed to be the same for all countries. In this scenario, although the signs 
of all variables are in line with predictions, evidence appears strongest for 
the hypothesis of routinization. Interacting country dummies with these 
17 
 
variables and testing for their joint significance further confirms the 
conjecture of routinization.  
In Goos and Manning’s (2007) Lousy and Lovely Jobs: the rising polarization of 
work in Britain, SBTC is primarily used to explain rising wage inequality. 
However, as anticipated above, Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) have 
proposed a more nuanced way of understanding the impact of technology, 
in which the latter can replace human labour in routine tasks (step-by-step 
procedures or rules) but cannot do so in non-routine duties. The main 
argument in Goos and Manning’s (2007) therefore is that the impact of 
technology will be to bring about an increase in the relative demand for both 
well-paid skilled occupations (that frequently require non-routine cognitive 
aptitudes) as well as for low-paid least-skilled jobs (that commonly require 
non-routine manual skills). Likewise, it is assumed that there will be a 
decrease in the relative demand for the “middling” jobs that have 
characteristically needed both routine manual and cognitive skills — a 
process we call job polarization. The data utilised in this study was the New 
Earnings Survey (NES) and the Labour Force Survey (LFS). For the NES, 
annual panel data started in 1968, although the first computerized records 
date from 1975 (the sample includes all individuals whose UK National 
Insurance number ends in 14). In order to retrieve information on pay, hours, 
occupation and industry for the employees, tax records were used to contact 
employers. In theory, this was a random sample, but the review did indeed 
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undersample part-time workers (whose income is too low to be recorded 
through the National Insurance system) and those that had changed jobs 
recently. The LFS, in turn, provided a different set of data: it was first 
conducted in 1975, and done every two years until 1983, then annually until 
1992, and thereafter quarterly. Although this provided no wage information 
until 1993, and despite it being a smaller sample overall, the LFS data was 
closer to a random sample. Moreover, job was defined as a particular 
occupation, or as a particular occupation in a particular industry, with very 
similar results. Three-digit occupation codes (approximately 370 jobs) were 
considered, and the interaction of three-digit occupation and one-digit 
industry classification was also considered. The combined approach resulted 
in a maximum of 3700 jobs, but in practice only 1600 jobs were reviewed, 
given that not all occupations are represented in all industries.  Among the 
main results that arose from this inquiry, the use of US data from ALM 
(2003) suggests that the occupations that involve non-routine tasks tend to be 
at the top and bottom of the wage spectrum. At the same time, it appears 
that the jobs that require routine tasks tend to be in the middle, thus leading 
to job polarization as a predicted result. Specifically for the 1975-1999 period, 
a review of job polarization in the UK using median wage as a proxy for job 
quality, demonstrates that there has been growth in lousy jobs together with 
a much larger growth in lovely jobs. It also shows a decline in the number of 
middling jobs. Notably, the usage of the method of Juhn, Murphy and Pierce 
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(1993), which predicts employment growth at each percentile of the wage 
distribution, backs the hypothesis of job polarization. This is commensurate 
with the ALM provision but also with other factors of significance, such as 
the changes in the configuration of consumer demand and trade and the 
composition of the labour force (the rising labour market participation of 
women, as well as changes in age and education structure). As regards the 
employment of non-manual workers, the pattern of within and between-
industry developments in employment that flows from the one-digit 
occupation level is consistent with the ALM assumption that technical 
progress has uprooted the labour of manual and clerical workers across all 
sectors of the economy. It is also observed that a differential productivity 
growth between service and manufacturing sectors has led to an increase in 
low-wage service employment. It is also noticeable that the noted change 
towards a more educated type of labour has taken place mostly within jobs, 
and that even in the worst jobs there has been a rapid rise in the educational 
development of workers. Two possible interpretations of this circumstance 
are offered. The first one is that there has been SBTC within jobs as we define 
them, so that the consensus view on the importance of SBTC remains correct. 
The second one is that, while the job distribution has become more polarized, 
the educational attainment of all groups in the population has risen, and 
some educated workers have ended up being forced into low-skill jobs at the 
bottom end of the distribution. The advantage of this second argument is 
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that it helps explain why there has been a simultaneous increase in both the 
return to education (the demand for educated workers has risen since the 
number of good jobs has multiplied), as well as in the level of over-
education, as some authors have claimed. A distinction between these 
hypotheses requires evidence on changing skill requirements within jobs 
that is difficult to find if one considers the extent to which the observed job 
polarization can explain the rise in wage inequality between the 1970s and 
1990s.  A further observation is that only a small proportion of the increase in 
wage inequality could be explained by the polarization of jobs alone, 
whereas most of the evolution of wage inequality could be elucidated by 
taking into account the fact that wage growth appears to be, monotonically, 
in a positive correlation to the level of quality of jobs. The inference is that 
the rise in “within-group” wage inequality that other authors have 
highlighted is rather a by-product of a limited notion of a “group.” It is also 
observed that this rise largely vanishes if one examines job controls. Having 
said that, the conclusion that the wages in the lousy jobs are decreasing by 
comparison to wages in the middling jobs appears somewhat problematical 
for the ALM hypothesis: on the assumption that relative demand is rising in 
the lousy jobs relative to the middling ones, one could, in fact, expect the 
exact opposite. 
The work by Autor, Katz, Kearney (2006) stems from a reconsideration of the 
revisionist view, triggered by the episodic wage inequality in the 1980s and 
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inconsistency with SBTC. Among the circumstances analysed are the rapid 
growth of employment in jobs at the top and bottom relative to the middle of 
the skill distribution, as well as the solid expansion of 90-10 wage differential 
by 21 log points. In the late 1980s, upper-half wage inequality growth 
continued to rise steadily, while lower-half inequality growth ceased. From 
1973 to 1988, specifically, there was also an almost linear spreading out of the 
entire wage distribution. By contrast, since 1988 age growth has polarized, 
with the bottom quartile exhibiting a faster wage growth as compared to the 
middle two quartiles: the top quartile, for its part, shows the most 
accelerated increase and a continued spreading out of the wage distribution. 
The study further observes that the first-order effect of computerization is 
the displacement of “middle skilled” tasks: that is, repetitive production 
work as well as routine cognitive and manual duties such as bookkeeping. If 
these type of tasks are more complementary to high-skilled abstract tasks 
than to “non-routine manual” tasks (such as those performed by truck 
drivers, for instance), then the computerization of routine work can generate 
labour market polarization. The suggested model therefore predicts that 
wage polarization is to be accompanied by employment polarization. The 
work also investigates trends in the “quality”, skill content, and task content 
of US jobs since 1980. Following the analysis by Goos and Manning’s (2003), 
it further explores how US employment growth by occupation has been 
related to skill proxied by initial educational levels or wages. The evidence 
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used in the survey sorted 3-digit occupations into percentiles by mean years 
of schooling in 1980, using information from the 1980 Census’ Integrated 
Public Use Microsample (IPUMS). This set of data indicated a polarization in 
the 1990s, with the most accelerated rises in high-skill jobs, while low-skill 
jobs showed a modest growth and the middle-skill jobs showed the slowest 
growth. The data also suggested a robustness of the pattern with an 
alternative skill definition (median hourly wage in an occupation in 1980). 
During the 1980s, employment growth was roughly monotonic in skill, and 
then polarized in the 1990s. Likewise, by using CPS data through 2002, 
variations in employment structure trends that require changes in 
employment by job task content are analysed by looking at industry-gender-
education cells. This showed that employment growth was most rapid in the 
1990s for jobs intensive in non-routine cognitive tasks (those most 
complementary with computerization). Meanwhile, for jobs intensive in 
routine cognitive and manual tasks (those most substitutable for computers), 
the 1990s, was a period of a considerable decline. Furthermore, for job 
intensive in non-routine manual tasks (typically required by low-wage 
occupations), their decline ceased in the 1990s.  These paradigms of 
employment growth by education, wages, and task intensity suggest that, 
over the last 15 years, labour demand shifts have availed low- and high-
wage workers relative to middle-wage workers. In contrast to this 
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conclusion, the labour demand shifts of the 1980s appear to have been 
monotonically rising in skill. 
The work examines further how a fall in the real price of computing power 
may be conducive to a polarization of work. In routine cognitive and manual 
tasks, such as clerical work and repetitive production duties, computer 
capital –denoted by K and measured in efficiency units– is a close substitute 
for human labour. Moreover, routine tasks input –as embodied in either 
human labour or computer capital– is a complement to workers that are 
engaged in abstract reasoning tasks, such as coordination and problem 
solving. Finally, there exists an array of non-routine manual duties for which 
computers cannot at present neither directly substitute nor strongly 
complement, such as those performed by truck drivers, waiters, and janitors. 
The precipitous decline in the price of computing power in recent decades 
appears as an exogenous driving force, since it lowers the price of routine 
task input and increases demand for routine tasks. A key observation of the 
suggested model is that computer technology does not seem to offer a direct 
substitute for the lowest-skilled workers; rather, computers appear to 
displace a set of “middle-skilled” routine tasks. The displacement of these 
intermediate-skilled tasks generates job polarization, and it does so through 
three mechanisms. First, computing power directly reduces the wage of 
middle-skill tasks. Computing power also boosts the wages of high-skilled 
(abstract) occupations through q-complementarity. On the wages of low-
24 
 
skilled (manual) tasks, the impacts are ambiguous, mainly due to offsetting 
effects of q-complementarity vis-à-vis the additional labour supply of 
workers that have been displaced from routine tasks.  Therefore, although 
computerization lifts the wage gap between abstract and routine tasks –the 
“upper-tail” inequality in the model–, it can either increase or compress the 
wage gap between routine and manual tasks –the model’s “lower-tail” 
inequality–, depending on whether the q-complementarity or labour supply 
effect dominates. 
Kaplanis (2007) provides another interesting empirical work which extends 
the work of Goos and Manning (2003) in order to look at regional 
geographical patterns in employment polarization in Britain. The analysis 
uses data from the New Earnings Survey (NES) on employees aged between 
16 and 64. The NES is an employer-based survey with a panel element, in 
which the same individuals are tracked from year to year. It started to be 
compiled in 1975 and provides information on approximately 160,000 
employees each year. Nevertheless, the research had to base its main results 
on the 1991-2001 period only, given that the occupational coding that the 
Office for National Statistics uses for NES changed in 1991. The eleven 
Standard Statistical Regions (SSRs) of Britain were used as the main regional 
classification. In this study, pay is used as a proxy for job quality. Employees 
in the NES are classified into 366 different jobs, based on the 3-digit Standard 
Occupational Classification (SOC90). For each occupation, a median pay 
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level is used as a measure of average job quality. Employment polarization is 
thus defined as an increase in the number of individuals employed in low-
paid and high-paid jobs relative to ‘average-paid’ occupations. In the period 
between 1991 and 2001, it is observed that many of the lowest-paid jobs 
underwent a significant growth in the share of all employees they enrolled – 
for example, bar staff (up 32 per cent relative to total employment growth) 
and sales assistants (up 47 per cent). Simultaneously, many jobs at the 
highest-paid end also experienced a very remarkable increase in their share 
of employment – for instance, financial institutions managers (up 73 per 
cent) and marketing and sales managers (up 54 per cent). According to 
median hourly pay, each of the 366 occupations was ranked from worst to 
best and then grouped into ten equally sized ‘job quality categories’, with 
‘job quality category 1’ being the lowest-paid category of the spectrum, and 
‘job quality category 10’ being the highest. For Britain as a whole for the 
1991-2001 period, the results show that the share of high-quality jobs 
increases. For low-quality jobs, there is also an increase, albeit to a lesser 
extent. Finally, for jobs of middling quality, the share declines. Looking 
within each region, a general pattern (with the sole exception of East Anglia) 
can be discerned of rising shares for both the high-paid and the low-paid 
jobs and of falling shares for the middle jobs. In London, this pattern is 
strongest, and a correlation review of job quality categories 1 and 10 (i.e. the 
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lowest and the highest) indeed demonstrates that the region with the 
strongest correlation between the two categories is London. 
The study by Cortes (2012) shows that the share of employment in high-skill, 
high-wage jobs as well as in low-skill, low-wage occupations has been on the 
rise relative to the share in occupations in the middle of the distribution. It 
also indicates that wages have grown faster at the top and the bottom of the 
distribution than in the middle sections. The innovative aspect of the 
research is the focus on the individual level predictions in terms of wage 
changes and occupational switching patterns. The main input from this 
paper are to formulate these individual-level predictions within this type of 
model, and to test them using data from the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID) from 1976 to 2007. The PSID is a longitudinal survey of 
almost 9,000 families across the country. Its data is available at an annual 
frequency between 1968 and 1997, and bi-annually from 1997 onwards. 
Following the same families since 1968, the PSID collects data on economic, 
health, and social behaviour, including the occupational affiliation of the 
household head and spouse, the wage on their main job at the time of a 
survey interview, and their total labour earnings in the previous calendar 
year. This instrument tracks individuals over time, making it possible to 
document the likelihood of transitions between different types of jobs, and to 
analyse the wage variations for workers with different labour market 
experiences. Occupations are then grouped based on an aggregation of 3-
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digit occupation codes into the three categories used in the model: routine 
(craftsmen, clerical, sales, foremen, labourers, operatives), non-routine 
manual (service occupations),  and non-routine cognitive (managerial and 
professional jobs). The use of micro-level type of evidence allow a closer 
scrutiny of the dynamics that underpin the aggregate patterns of 
employment and wage polarization: in particular, the manner in which 
particular subsets of workers have been impacted by routinization, as well as 
the changes over time in occupational wage premia , once selection has been 
accounted for. The results of the study show that for workers switching out 
of routine job, the evidence is strong for a selection based on ability. 
Likewise, it appears that low ability routine workers are more likely to 
switch to non-routine manual jobs, while high ability routine workers are 
more likely to switch to non-routine cognitive jobs. On the other hand, 
workers that stay in routine jobs tend to perform significantly worse than 
workers staying in any other type of occupation. From 1976 to the mid-2000, 
the wage premium for routine jobs is estimated to have fallen by 17% 
relative to the one for non-routine manual occupations (when taking account 
of changing returns to education, this is slightly reduced, to 14%). At the 
same time, the wage premium for non-routine cognitive jobs is estimated to 
have increased by 25% over the same period relative to the wage premium 
for non-routine manual occupations (although when taking account of 
changing returns to education, this goes significantly down, to 7%) . In terms 
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of wage growth between routine workers who stay or switch to other 
occupations, noticeable differences can also be observed. Over a short-run 
period, those who switch to non-routine manual jobs experience a lower 
wage growth vis-à-vis those who stay (around 14% lower over a two-year 
period). Subsequently, however, they recover from these losses; in fact, in the 
long run, they benefit from a much faster wage growth than stayers (5 to 
12% higher over a 10-year period). In turn, those who switch to non-routine 
cognitive ones will experience a much higher wage growth than stayers, and 
this applies to a variety of time horizons (6 to 12% higher over a two-year 
period, and 14 to 16% higher over a 10-year period). The predictions of the 
model concerning the general equilibrium effects of a positive shock to ln_rt 
can be outlined as along two main lines. First, in terms of switching patterns, 
the workers at the bottom of the ability distribution within routine 
occupations tend to switch to non-routine manual jobs. Likewise, the 
workers at the top of the ability distribution within routine occupations do 
switch to non-routine cognitive jobs. Finally, for non-routine workers (either 
manual or cognitive), no switching is induced. Secondly, as regards wage 
changes, workers staying in routine occupations experience a decrease in 
real wages relative to those staying in non-routine manual jobs. Moreover, 
workers who stay in non-routine cognitive jobs experience an increase in real 
wages relative to those staying in routine. Then, workers who switch from 
routine to non-routine occupations (either cognitive or manual) experience 
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an increase in real wages relative to those who stay in the routine 
occupation. 
The paper used wages reported for the current occupation, as they can be 
directly linked to the job that the respondent was working in at the time of 
the interview. The information regarding wages for salaried workers is only 
available from 1976 onwards, so the analysis only uses data from that 
year and thereafter. The most recent data the paper reviews corresponds to 
2007.The analysed sample was limited to male household heads only, aged 
16 to 64, who are employed in non-agricultural, non-military jobs, and who 
are also part of the Survey Research Center (SRC) sample. This is the main 
original sample from the PSID. Consequently, the over-sample of low-
income households (SEO sample) as well as the immigrant samples added in 
the 1990s were excluded from the review. Throughout the research a broad 
classification of jobs is used. Jobs are categorised into three groups, and this 
distinction is in turn based on the categories used by Acemoglu and Autor 
(2011). The groups are: a) non-routine cognitive jobs (that is, management, 
professional, technical, financial and business occupations); b) routine 
occupations, such as clerical, administrative support, craftsmen, sales 
workers, foremen, operatives, installation, production and transportation 
jobs, maintenance and repair occupations, labourers; and finally, non-routine 
manual jobs, ie. service workers. The classification is based on the 
aggregation of 3-digit occupational codes that map into these broad 
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categories. As explained in Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and supported by 
data from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, each group is labelled with 
the name of the main task performed by workers in that occupation. The 
outcome of the study was consistent with the prediction of the model. The 
data indicated a strong evidence of selection on ability in occupational 
mobility out of routine occupations: while workers of relatively high ability 
are more likely to switch to non-routine cognitive jobs, workers of relatively 
low ability are more likely to switch to non-routine manual ones. Notably, 
after the 1990s, the likelihood of switching to non-routine cognitive jobs 
increases more than the probability of switching to non-routine manual jobs 
for routine workers at all ability quintiles. This suggests that there has not 
been a large displacement of middle-skill workers towards low-skill jobs in 
the 1990s or 2000s, as it has been sometimes assumed. 
Autor and Dorn (2012) offer a comprehensive empirical review as well as an 
explanation of the polarization of employment in the United States. It 
analyses wages between 1980 and 2005, and the concomitant growth of low 
skill service jobs. The authors attribute polarization to the interaction 
between consumer preferences, which favour variety over specialization, 
and the falling cost of automating routine, codifiable job tasks. The work 
applies a spatial equilibrium model, with four implications of this hypothesis 
being derived, tested and confirmed. The research observes that local labour 
markets that were specialized in routine activities differentially adopted 
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information technology, reallocated low skill labour into service occupations 
(employment polarization), experienced earnings growth at the tails of the 
distribution (wage polarization), and received inflows of skilled labour. 
Finally Jaimovich and Siu (2012), explore the relationship between the 
phenomena of job polarization and jobless recoveries. The concept of job 
polarization is understood as the recent disappearance of employment in 
occupations in the middle of the skill distribution, while the notion of jobless 
recoveries refers to the slow rebound in aggregate employment following 
recent recessions, despite recoveries in aggregate output.  The authors note 
that job polarization is actually not a gradual process; essentially all of the 
job losses in middle-skill occupations occur in economic crises. Moreover, 
jobless recoveries in the aggregate are accounted for by jobless recoveries in 
the middle-skill occupations that are disappearing. The fact that 92% of the 
job loss in these occupations since the mid-1980s occurs within a 12-month 
window of NBER dated recessions (that have all been characterized by 
jobless recoveries) confirms the view that job polarization is not a gradual 
phenomenon. The loss of middle-skill, routing jobs is concentrated in 
economic downturns. A job polarization trend thus appears as a business 
cycle phenomenon. Employment in routine occupations account for an 
important fraction of aggregate employment averaged over the jobless 
recovery era, these jobs account for more than 50% of total employment.  
Jobless recoveries are observed only in these disappearing, middle-skill jobs. 
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The high- and low-skill occupations to which employment is polarizing 
either do not undergo contractions, or if they do, after the turning point in 
aggregate output they soon experience a rebound. Jobless recoveries can be 
traced to the disappearance of routine occupations in recessions. Notably, in 
routine occupations (nor in aggregate employment) prior to the era of job 
polarization, jobless recoveries were not observed. 
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3. Conceptual Framework  
Figure 1: The relationship between job polarization, labour market institutions & reforms, wage inequality 
 
Routinization Job Polarization
Labour Market 
Institutions
If there is technological convergence among 
the European labour markets, because of 
routinization, why then do we still have 
different levels of job polarization across 
these countries? Can institutions explain 
the diverging employment growth rates? 
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4. Operationalisation  
The main research questions in this thesis are addressed in three empirical 
papers. In this section I briefly outline the puzzle in each paper, the working 
hypotheses, the empirical methodologies adopted and the main findings.   
 
PAPER 1 – Structural Employment Changes and the Disappearing Middle-
Class 
The puzzle at the heart of this first paper concerns the main failure of the 
literature on job polarization: if there is technological convergence among the 
European labour markets why then do we still have different levels of 
polarization across these countries? What is behind the diverging 
employment growth rates?  The main aim of this paper is to show that, 
although the routinization hypothesis remains the most plausible cause of 
job polarization, the type of institutional framework peculiar to each country 
shapes the distinctive patterns that can be observed.  
Oesch (2013) among others pointed out two main views as to what kind of 
impact institutions may have on the occupational structure. Krugman (1994) 
argues that institutions lead among lowly educated workers to a trade-off 
between wages and employment. High wage floors and powerful trade 
unions lead to low growth in low-skilled services, high unemployment, low 
inequality. Whereas deregulation leads to job creation in low-end services 
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but higher inequality. Therefore setting high wages floors favors the creation 
of decent jobs but leads to weak growth in low-skilled services and to high 
unemployment. Deregulation of wage-setting institutions promotes job 
creation in low-end services. The second view is associated to Streeck(1997) 
and Acemoglu(2003) and asserts that employers opt for a "high road" vs "low 
road" job strategy depending on the institutional permissiveness: low-wage, 
low-skill, low training and low productivity jobs vs high-skill and high-
productivity (upgrading). 
These theoretical premises can therefore be tested by concentrating on the 
effect on employment changes of three main labour market institutions: 
employment protection legislation (EPL), trade union density and minimum 
wages.  
The three main hypotheses I am putting forward are:  
• Hypothesis H1: EPL insulates insiders which dampens down the 
routinization effect 
• Hypothesis H2: Trade unions resist technology-induced occupational 
changes 
• Hypothesis H3: Minimum wages constrain the growth of low skilled jobs  
The paper relies on the analysis of seven sets of data: the European Union 
Labour Force Survey (EU LFS), the United Kingdom Labour Force Survey 
(UKLFS), the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions 
(EU-SILC), the Routing Task Intensity (RTI) index, the Princeton Data 
Improvement Initiative (PDII) dataset, and the CEP-OECD Institutions 
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Dataset. It starts by looking at the employment  patterns in the European 
Labour Force Survey(EU LFS) and follows a methodology which resembles 
closely the one adopted by Goos, Manning and Salomons(2014), however, it 
further extends this framework by testing the joint effect of routinization and 
labour market institutions  on employment structures.  
Moving to the discussion of the results against the hypotheses set above I 
find H1 to be confirmed: job polarization operates through routinization, but 
this effect is mitigated by employment protection legislation. A higher 
strictness of regulation on dismissals and on the use of temporary contracts 
thus constrains the job polarization patterns, making the hollowing out of the 
labour market more subdued. I don’t find evidence for H2 of trade unions 
resisting the routinization effect. It may be that trade unions dampen the 
effect of firing within a firm, thus the slightly positive coefficient, however 
we could have entire firms going bankrupt because of automation therefore 
the interaction effect between routinization and trade unions becomes not 
significant. For the last hypothesis H3, minimum wages do not seem to exert 
a significant effect on job polarization patterns when interacted with 
routinization. The evidence provided thus suggests that the claim of a 
pervasive technology-induced polarization should be revised in order to 
comprise a role for the institutional component.  
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PAPER II – The Routinization of Labour Market Reforms  
In the second paper I ask whether job polarization has a feedback effect on 
labour market institutions and policies, so that different degrees of 
polarization lead to different articulations of institutions at the domestic level, 
thus reinforcing or altering differences in national models across the 
European space. This paper is thus aimed at establishing whether there is a 
relationship between the extent of polarization exhibited by each European 
country and their specific labour market reform processes. The political 
economy channel at the core of the analysis sees a decreased bargaining 
power of trade unions due to the hollowing out of their power base 
(particularly relevant for manufacturing) translated into a weakened 
intermediating effect in the labour market reform process. The decrease in 
concerted power thus reflects into an increased reform activity, a move 
towards deregulation and a decrease in the generosity of the policy measures. 
The hypotheses that the paper sets out are the following: 
• Hypothesis H1: The erosion of privileged interest representation and a 
weakened power of intermediation translate into a heightened intensity of 
labour market reforms  
 
• Hypothesis H2: The erosion of privileged interest representation and a 
weakened power of intermediation translate into a higher degree of 
deregulation and decreased generosity of policy measures 
 
• Hypothesis H3: LMEs are polarization consistent leading to a lower 
pressure to reform  
 
• Hypothesis H4: CMEs are polarization incompatible leading to an increased 
reform activity  
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The analysis finds that the job polarization experienced by a particular 
country in the 5 years before the reform instance is consistently among the 
strongest predictors of reform activity, as significant as other drivers such as 
GDP growth and government net debt. Moreover a higher degree of 
polarization tends to be associated with more deregulation and a decrease in 
the generosity of the policy measure. Finally, the empirical framework is 
tested against more conventional taxonomies of welfare capitalism (Esping-
Andersen and VoC) revealing how both the continental and liberal regimes 
have been profoundly affected by job polarization. 
The results thus show that job polarization increases both the number and 
direction of labour market reforms in Europe and major differences arise 
across the different models of capitalism. LMEs, because of their reliance on 
flexibility and the harnessing of market dynamics, are found to be 
polarization consistent. CMEs instead are polarization incompatible: 
technological advancement destabilizes the system and therefore more 
reforms are needed. This results that seems to raise again questions about the 
possible Convergence of CMEs toward LMEs. 
 
PAPER III – Falling Behind: The Decoupling of Job and Wage Polarization 
in Europe 
The hollowing out of the middle in the US labour market produced both job 
and wage polarization patterns which persisted throughout the period 1985-
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2005. However, while wage inequality has been on the rise also in Europe, 
this paper will try to understand whether wage polarization, and the 
distinctive U-shaped impact on the wage distribution has materialized across 
European countries as well.  
The hypotheses in this paper build on the theoretical framework provided by 
Lemieux(2008) who argues that where wage-setting institutions are weak, a 
negative technological change depresses the wage growth in the sector where 
automation is stronger, instead where they are strong, wages in the medium 
sector remain stable despite the same negative demand change.  
I set out a number of hypotheses to understand what is happening to the 
wage distribution in terms of upper-tail (90/50) inequality and lower-tail 
inequality (50/10) and build on the results from the two previous papers. In 
particular I will test: 
• Hypothesis H1:  EPL reduces upper-tail inequality (90/50) while 
maintaining or increasing lower-tail (50/10) inequality 
• Hypothesis H2: Job polarization increases upper-tail inequality 
(90/50) while reducing lower-tail (50/10) inequality 
In my empirical analysis, I start by looking at wage dynamics and evolutions 
across sectors for the EU and US in the last three decades in order to find 
evidence of wage polarization. Secondly, my analysis includes fixed effects 
regressions of wage inequality ratios (upper 90/50 and lower tail 50/10) on 
wage determinants common in the literature and separately on an 
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institutional factor (employment protection legislation) and on job 
polarization. Finally, I try to unveil wage dynamics over time according to 
the Varieties of Capitalism taxonomy.  
By relying on the Occupational Wages around the World (OWW) Database 
compiled by Richard B. Freeman and Remco H. Oostendorp, which contains 
wage data covering 171 countries from 1983 to 2008 derived from the ILO 
October Inquiry database, I thus investigate the effects on wage inequality of 
both secular trends of technological change, as evidenced by job polarization, 
as well as institution-based explanations. 
The findings show that no sign of wage polarization can be found in the EU: 
the wage dynamics show that the middle sector has not been hollowed out in 
terms of wage growth as in the case of the US, which I also show. Secondly, 
job polarization increased upper-tail inequality (90-50) and decreased lower-
tail (50-10) inequality but that employment protection legislation restrained 
these wage effects. Finally, after splitting my sample for standardised hourly 
wages into the LMEs vs CMEs I find that wages in LMEs are much more 
dispersed than in CMEs and this pattern is preserved when looking at the 
evolution over time. 
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PAPER I 
Structural Employment Changes and the 
Disappearing Middle-Class 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the evolution of employment patterns in the 
European labour markets over the period 1993-2011 and attempts to 
show that, although the routinization hypothesis remains the most 
plausible cause of job polarization, it is the peculiar type of 
institutional framework that ultimately shapes the distinctive patterns 
that can be observed. Based on the analysis of the European Labour 
Force Survey(EU LFS) data, this paper follows a methodology which 
resembles closely the one adopted by Goos, Manning and 
Salomons(2014). However, it further extends this framework by testing 
the joint effect of routinization and labour market institutions on 
employment structures. The evidence provided suggests that the claim 
of a pervasive technology-induced polarization could be revised in 
order to comprise a role for the institutional component.  
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1. Puzzle and Relevance 
The puzzle at the heart of this paper concerns the main failure of the 
literature on job polarization: if there is technological convergence among the 
European labour markets why then do we still have different levels of 
polarization across these countries? What is behind the diverging 
employment growth rates?  Looking at Figure 1 on the next page, why is 
Italy for instance exhibiting a shrinking of both lowest and middle-income 
occupations and an enormous increase in highest-income occupations, while 
the United Kingdom and The Netherlands exhibit patterns more in line with 
the classic job polarization phenomenon? The main aim of this paper is to 
show that, although the routinization hypothesis remains the most plausible 
cause of job polarization, the type of institutional framework peculiar to each 
country shapes the distinctive patterns that can be observed.  
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Figure 2: elabourated by the author based on the data from Job Polarization in 
Europe by Goos et al. (2009). 
 
 
-0.59
1.48
-0.96
6.66
-0.74
3.05
1.75
1.58
6.19
-8.2
-1.66
2.27
4.96
2.39
0.96
1.9
5.77
-14.58
-9.5
-7.16
-6.54
-12.07
-8.71
-6.08
-7.77
-5.47
-9.08
-8.45
-4.68
-6.52
-1.13
-7.04
-6.93
-10.32
15.17
8.03
8.13
-0.12
12.81
5.67
4.34
6.19
-0.72
10.1
2.41
1.57
-1.26
6.07
5.03
4.55
-16 -11 -6 -1 4 9 14
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
EU average
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
UK
Share of total hours worked, change between 1993 
and 2006, percentage points 
High-Income Occupations Middle-Income Occupations
Lowest-Income Occupations
44 
 
From the review of the economic literature analysing the impact of 
technological change on production (Autor, Katz, Karney, 2006; Acemoglu 
and Autor, 2010; Goos & Manning, 2007) the dominant picture that emerges 
is that routinization has led to a hollowing out of the employment 
distribution in the middle and a simultaneous expansion at the top and 
bottom (see Figure 3 below).  
 
Figure 3: The Growth of Low Skill Service Jobs and the Polarization of the 
U.S. Labour Market 
 
Source: Autor and Dorn (2012) 
The dramatic implication of this literature is that such a “pervasive pattern of 
technology-induced polarization” will inevitably shape the global 
socioeconomic structures leaving no room for the intervention of 
policymakers. However, are we sure that over the last decades the European 
labour markets have exhibited a uniform pattern of job polarization? If this is 
not the case, what is the role played by labour market institutions in 
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explaining diverging magnitudes of this phenomenon? These are the 
questions this paper will try to address and by uncovering the evolution in 
the employment patterns it will also provide a tentative answer to the 
broader questions raised above.  
As also argued by Fernàndez-Maciàs, Hurely and Storrie in their recent book 
Transformation of the Employment Structure in the EU and USA, 1995–2007, 
although these papers have a solid theoretical framework, Skill-Biased 
Technical Change(SBTC), proposed by Autor, Levy and Murnane in 2003, 
their main support comes from the empirical analyses of the labour markets 
in the US and Europe since the 1990s (Autor, Dorn, 2009; Goos et al, 2009).  
The findings of Fernàndez-Macìas(2012) are extremely insightful since they 
reveal a picture of job polarization which is very fragmented across Europe. 
Despite the lack of a regression analysis, which transforms the empirical 
exercise into a mere qualitative comparison, the author is able to classify the 
changes in the employment structures into three main categories: 
Polarization, Upgrading and Mid-Upgrading, associated respectively with 
the three main families of welfare capitalism (Continental Europe, 
Scandinavian countries and Southern Europe). Two other interesting works 
to understand the contribution of this paper are Pertold-Gebicka(2013) and 
Nellas and Olivieri(2013) which highlight a negative relationship between 
employment protection strictness and the extent of polarization; these add 
further support for the role played by labour market institutions.  
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My paper is based mainly on the analysis of the data from the European 
Labour Force Survey(EU15) and follows a methodology which resembles 
closely the one adopted in Goos et al. 2014, but will diverge from it for the 
presence of a set of variables capturing the effect of labour market 
institutions. The main divergence from the original paper lies in the 
introduction of a set of institutional variables extracted from the CEP-OECD 
Institutions Dataset. These are the sections along which this paper will be 
structured: first, I will start by exploring thoroughly the literature on SBTC 
and job polarization that has emerged in the last decade and I will try to 
highlight where the main failure lies. Subsequently, I will set forth my main 
hypothesis concerning technological convergence and job polarization 
patterns. A section dedicated to the test of this hypothesis will follow this 
and finally I will confront my results with the existing theoretical and 
empirical findings of the literature.   
 
2. Literature Review  
This paper hinges on three main streams of literature. First the shift in the 
modelling of technology from a theoretical framework based on skills to one 
based on tasks will be considered. Secondly, the impact of labour market 
institutions on occupational changes. Finally, this paper contributes to a 
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more recent literature that looks at the interaction between the technological 
and institutional components and its impact on employment growth and 
occupational patterns.   
 
2.1 From Skilled biased to Routine biased technological change  
The theoretical framework of Skill-Biased Technical Change has been 
comprehensively reviewed by Acemoglu(2002). In his work the author tries 
to give an answer to two main questions: first, why have technological 
advances been skill-biased in the twentieth century while in the nineteenth-
century they replaced skilled workers and expanded tasks performed by the 
unskilled? Second, are technological changes the major cause of the recent 
increase in inequality?  The main argument put forth by the author is that 
“the development and use of technology is, at least in part, a response to 
profit incentives. When developing skill-biased techniques is more profitable, 
new technology will tend to be skill-biased.” Therefore we can explain the 
difference between the two centuries by claiming that in the nineteenth-
century we had skill-replacing developments because of the increased 
supply of unskilled workers, which made the production of these 
technologies profitable. On the other hand technical change became skilled-
bias in the next century because “the rapid increase in the supply of skilled 
workers has induced the development of skill-complementary technologies”. 
The vast literature he reviews relies mainly on a dichotomous model of the 
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labour market in which the demand for skilled labour expands while the one 
for unskilled labour shrinks when we introduce technical change.  This 
suggests that the main prediction is upgrading rather than polarization of 
employment. In 2003, Autor, Levy and Murnane in their paper The Skill 
Content of Recent Technological Change: An Empirical Exploration provide a 
simple model based on a task framework which puts forth the argument of 
routinization: “computer technology substitutes for workers in performing 
routine tasks that can be readily described with programmed rules, while 
complementing workers in executing nonroutine tasks demanding flexibility, 
creativity, generalized problem-solving capabilities, and complex 
communications”.  In their analysis on how computerization affected job-
skill demand between 1960 and 1998, the authors thus took in consideration 
two principal types of tasks: (1) tasks that may be carried out by following a 
definite set of rules (this includes both cognitive and manual tasks), and (2) 
tasks which entail problem-solving or complex communication. Tasks 
pertaining to the first category may also be defined as ‘routine’ tasks, while 
tasks pertaining to the second category may be referenced as ‘non-routine’ 
tasks. The results of the study show a shift in the level of worker-input with 
regards to each type of task. Specifically, for routine tasks a significant 
decrease in labour-input was registered following the advancement of 
computer technology. On the contrary, non-routine cognitive tasks 
experienced an increase in the amount of labour-input. Thus, the authors 
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developed the hypothesis that computers may substitute workers 
performing routine tasks while aiding workers in the performance of non-
routine jobs.  
In the same year Goos & Manning further elabourated the routinization 
hypothesis with its four categories(manual vs. cognitive, routine vs. non-
routine) into an argument for polarization.  The authors analyse the UK 
employment structure since the 1970s emphasizing that there was a strong 
growth in “lousy and lovely job” (bottom and top) relative to the middle of 
the distribution. They explained this by claiming that there was a general 
equilibrium effect, which shifted employment towards the jobs in which 
productivity was low, where, in other words, technology could not be 
applied.   
Two further publications made the job polarization argument prominent. In 
2006 Autor, Katz and Kearney provide a set of empirical findings, which 
suggest that “demand shifts are likely to be a key component of any cogent 
explanation for the changing US wage structure”. A wage structure, which 
has become polarized in the last three decades mainly because of the impact 
of information technology and indirectly because of outsourcing. The 
evidence for the European labour markets comes few years later when Goos, 
Manning and Salomons(2009) expand their previous work on the UK and 
argue strongly for a pervasive technology-induced polarization across all the 
employment structures of the Old Continent. Their analysis covers the 
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period 1993-2006 and suggests that like in the United States and the United 
Kingdom, also in Europe we have experienced a disproportionate increase in 
high-paid and low-paid employment. Their claim is the following: 
“pervasive job polarization is in line with the evidence that in advanced 
countries, technologies are becoming more intense in the use of non-routine 
tasks concentrated in high-paid and low-paid service jobs, at the expense of 
routine tasks concentrated in manufacturing and clerical work. The evidence 
for alternative explanations –offshoring and wage inequality(used as a proxy 
for institutions)  – is much weaker”. This is a very powerful statement 
because it implies that routinization is the main cause behind the 
polarization of employment and that countries belonging to distinct welfare 
systems exhibit a “similar” pattern, despite differences in unionization rates 
or collective bargaining systems, in other words institutions, are completely 
ignored.   
Before moving to the next section, I would like to focus on another criticism 
that was moved against Goos et al. (2009) and that concerns the supporting 
evidence behind their main claim. Fernàndez-Macìas asserts that “there is no 
direct evidence of the existence of a mechanism linking the IT evolution and 
the alleged polarization of developed economies’ employment structures. 
Simply, the IT revolution and its task-biased impact on labour demand seems 
like a plausible explanation for such a pervasive polarization pattern, and the 
practical absence of any variation suggests that other factors must have 
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played just a very minor role in the recent evolution of employment 
structures across Europe”.   Two recent studies have actually tried to fill this 
gap. Michaels, Natraj, Van Reenen in their 2010 paper, Has ICT Polarized Skill 
Demand? Evidence from Eleven Countries over 25 years, carry out a cross-
country study and suggest that the industries that adopted IT at faster rates 
(in terms of IT spending and spending on R&D) saw the highest demand for 
highly-skilled workers and a simultaneous shrinkage of the individuals with 
intermediate skills. To avoid a possible identification issue posed by the 
endogeneity of IT adoption to globalisation, a second paper was written by 
Bloom, Draca and Van Reenen which shows that the industries that were 
more exposed to Chinese imports responded by “innovating more in order to 
move up the value chain” (The Economist, Sept 2010). However, when one 
confronts these findings with Goos et al.(2009) the IT and job polarization 
patterns do no appear to match completely, most probably because of the 
different databases used in their analyses and the different time periods 
covered. Therefore a definitive answer to the lack of a convincing mechanism 
explaining the patterns has not been found yet.  
 
2.2 Labour Market Institutions and Occupational Change  
The second stream of literature considered in this paper looks at the impact 
that labour market institutions have on occupational structures. Far from 
reaching a convergence of views on the magnitude and direction of this 
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effect, there is a consensus that wage-setting institutions ultimately shape the 
demand by employers and the workers’ supply of labour, and this will be 
particularly crucial for the low-skilled. As highlighted by Oesch(2013) the 
view that dominated during the 1990s was put forward by Paul 
Krugman(1994), who emphasized how institutions lead to a trade-off 
between wages and employment. The second theoretical argument instead is 
based on the works of Streeck (1997) and Acemoglu (2003) who argue that 
employers are faced with the choice of either pursuing a “high road” or a 
“low road” job strategy. The “high road” hinges on the upgrading of the 
work force and has traditionally been followed by West European countries 
which have featured collective bargaining, stricter employment protection 
legislations, and welfare-state benefits. The opposite strategy instead was 
favoured by American employers who, in a more lenient institutional 
environment, chose the more profitable low-wage path.  
Wage-setting institutions could therefore either have a constraining effect on 
employers’ demand thus leading to greater unemployment or they could act 
as an opportunity for firms to increase investment in their lowly qualified 
workforce. The low-skilled interpersonal service jobs will be the most 
affected segment of the skill distribution primarily because its tasks are less 
subject to automation, more difficult to outsource and to trade. The 
compression of the wage structure does not only concern the bargaining 
system and the role played by trade unions, but entails also a consideration 
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of the level of the minimum wage. This will act as a powerful factor for the 
demand for personal services and will ultimately determine the choice 
between home production and market-supplied services. For instance  
Rogerson (2008) finds that between 1956 to 2003 European workers spent on 
average 45% less time on the job compared to their American counterparts. 
This trend can be easily explained when looking at the service sector of each 
of the two economies. Over the abovementioned time period, Europe’s 
service market sector expands at a significantly lower rate compared to that 
of the United States.  
 
 
2.3 Job polarization and Labour Market Institutions  
In this section I focus on the critical analysis of three recent papers that have 
attempted to introduce a role for institutions in their investigation of the job 
polarization phenomenon.  
I.  Job Polarization in Europe? Changes in the Employment Structure and Job 
Quality, 1995-2007 by Enrique Fernàndez-Macìas (2012) 
This paper by Fernàndez-Macìas provides the most critical assessment of the 
work by Goos et al.(2009), both with regards to the construction of the 
empirical framework and the conclusions reached by the authors; probably 
its main weakness is the lack of a proper regression analysis. The 
fundamental argument of Fernàndez-Macìas is that Goos et al. assume that 
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labour is not unstructured and uniform, but “structured by technology and 
the division of labour into different occupations or types of jobs”, however 
differently from the “New Structuralist” approach in sociology, here no role 
for institutions is envisaged. The author provides a very solid theoretical 
framework to support his thesis of the importance of labour market 
institutions. He defines institutions very broadly, as “power relations in 
work/labour market and regulation”. Firstly, he exploits the arguments of the 
segmentation theorists and of occupational sociology. “The division of labour 
is an object of struggle” which sees on one side employers trying to get the 
most from production and on the other the workers which try to resist; from 
sociology the concept of “occupational power” used not only against 
employers but also against other groups of workers. Second, he focuses on 
the argument that some occupations are generated by regulation and they 
remain “institutionally protected”: the mechanisms at work in this case are 
mainly through the structure of labour costs and these institutions will affect 
occupational groups differently. He has two main hypotheses that he intends 
to test:  
- ‘the type of diversity we find in the patterns of occupation change should be 
somehow related to the well-known institutional families of Europe’ (Esping-
Andersen 1999) 
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- ‘there should be more diversity in the middle and bottom of the employment 
structure than in the top’ since he claims that the institutional arrangements 
usually have an effect on these segments in particular.  
The analysis framework adopted by the author resembles the one of Goos et 
al. (2009) but differs from it in three fundamental ways: the definition of jobs, 
the job quality rankings and the construction of the job quality tiers. Instead 
of the 21 occupational titles here the author use a list two digit occupation-
by-sector definition of jobs, which should be more consistent across the 15 
European countries. Jobs are ranked according to country-specific wage 
levels rather than using only the UK 1994 median hourly wages. Finally, and 
this is I think the most crucial difference, Fernàndez-Macìas does not follow 
Goos et al. who classify the ranked jobs in three categories (good, middling, 
and bad jobs) but rather he groups jobs in five “equal-sized groups” ranked 
by their median hourly wages, which are then called quintiles. It is extremely 
important to stress that they are “equal-sized groups” since Goos et al. have 
very unequal sizes for their groups, which could undermine their whole 
approach. The Table 1 from Fernàndez-Macìas(2012) is presented here in 
order to clarify this point.  
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Table 1:  Comparison of occupational groupings between Goos et al.(2009) 
and Fernàndez-Macìas(2012) 
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Source: Fernàndez-Macìas(2012) 
Looking at the results, the author frames them mainly around two figures: 
‘Relative change in employment by wage quintiles 1995-2007’ and ‘Relative 
change in employment by education quintiles, 1995-2007’ which are aimed at 
disproving the hypothesis of a pervasive job polarization across Europe. As 
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you can observe below, both figures were divided into three columns: 
Polarization, Upgrading and Mid-Upgrading.  
Figure 4: Relative change in employment by wage quintiles, 1995-2007  
 
Source: Fernàndez-Macìas(2012). 
Figure 5: Relative change in employment by education quintiles, 1995-2007.  
 
Source: Fernàndez-Macìas(2012). 
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The division appears slightly artificial for some countries but it definitely 
supports the claim of heterogeneity of patterns across Europe. The first 
column should exhibit a “near symmetric polarized pattern of job 
polarization” however the only clear example for this is the Netherlands. The 
second classification, upgrading, is manly occupied by the Nordic countries 
and is characterized by a very high increase in the highest quintiles. Finally 
the last column has been termed mid-upgrading because the expansion of 
employment occurred also in the quintiles in the middle. Based on these 
findings, the author therefore claims that job polarization was only one of 
three phenomena that characterized the European labour markets. He 
stresses that these three main patterns match with the usual European 
institutional families: Continental Europe is usually associated with 
polarization, the Nordic countries have undergone an upgrading process and 
finally Southern Europe can be related with a pattern of expansion in both 
middle and high quintiles.  
The author also provides an historical reconstruction of the possible 
institutional changes that could have affected the patterns across the 
European labour markets and that could explain their dissimilarities. 
Continental Europe experienced a process of labour market deregulation in 
the 1990s and early 2000s, which led to a “destandardization of their lowest 
paid jobs”. The three Nordic countries have very strong unions and very 
compressed wage structures, which has meant a shift in production to 
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“higher-value added activities”. Finally according to the author, for Southern 
Europe the creation of the European Monetary Union has resulted in a “very 
fast pace of employment expansion”.  
 
II.  Job Polarization and Labour Market Institution by Viki Nellas and 
Elisabetta Olivieri 
In this paper the authors propose a theoretical model to study the effects of a 
technological shock on a unionized economy, which tries therefore to test for 
the joint effect of technology and institutions on labour market changes. 
Their study focuses on six European countries: Italy, Spain, France, Greece, 
Belgium and the UK and accounts for the respective collective bargaining 
processes thus trying to explain the observed cross-country heterogeneity. 
Their claim is that in Continental Europe differently from the US, the 
shrinkage of the middling paid occupations has not been accompanied by an 
increase in the share of low-paid employment. Rather than job polarization 
the authors emphasize the emergence of low-skill unemployment.  
The model can be understood as one in which an employment target is 
defined and the union can choose different policies depending on this. What 
emerges from this framework is therefore a clear trade-off between low 
skilled wage growth and low skilled employment growth. The main concern 
I believe is that the outcome of their theoretical model is not consistent with 
the empirical analysis they provide. Also, the results are not in line with 
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what obtained by Goos et al.(2009). They claim that in the last 15 years there 
has been an upgrading trend rather than a polarization one because of the 
clear bias towards high-paid jobs occupations and decrease in mid-range and 
lowest paid occupations.  
 
However, I think that the added value of this paper rests with two the 
correlations that have been carried out and that are shown below. In the 
Figure 6, the authors use employment protection legislation(as elabourated 
by the OECD) and the difference of the employment shares of low-skilled 
and middling-skilled jobs: according to them the higher the difference, the 
more polarized is the employment structure. This correlation appears to be 
negative. Therefore more polarization is associated with less strict EPL. Once 
also my results are elabourated it will be useful to make a comparison.  
Figure 6: EPL index and the share of low-quality jobs. 
 
Source: Nellas, Olivieri (2013) 
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The second interesting graph is the one that looks at the pattern of the low-
paid employment and the unemployment rate. The correlation also in this 
case is negative and the authors claim that “countries where job 
opportunities in low qualified tasks have increased the most have 
experienced less unemployment”, however we need to be careful here, since 
this remains a statistical correlation and I would not use it as a strong proof 
to state “the wage effect prevails on the employment effect”.   
 
Figure 7: Unemployment rate and the share of low-quality jobs 
 
Source: Nellas, Olivieri (2013) 
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III.  Job Polarization and Employment Protection in Europe by Barbara Pertold-
Gebicka 
In this paper the author constructs a measure of the skill requirements of 
occupations, which is supposedly independent of country-specific labour 
supply conditions. This is achieved by using an alternative measure, which 
corresponds to the relative productivity of more and less skilled workers 
employed in each occupation. According to the author “it measures how 
crucial workers’ skills are for the tasks performed within a specific 
occupation” and skill requirements are measured on the US labour market 
for two reasons: first, being the USA leader in technological development, 
this should ensure that the estimated skill requirements capture recent 
technological changes; second, “the elasticity of substitution between more 
and less skilled workers, used to retrieve the skill-intensity measure, is based 
on US estimates”.  Despite the effort, I do not think this is an innovative 
measure, since the procedure followed by Goos et al.(2009) also exploited a 
dataset for occupations which was based on the US labour market. Again 
also for this paper the interesting part is represented by the section which 
looks at the relationship between the extent of job polarization (1993-2001) 
and the strength of employment protection. Differently from above, here the 
extent of polarization is measured as the difference between the lowest 
change in employment share and the highest change in employment share 
and the graph is constructed controlling for country-specific average 
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educational attainment and the industrial structure in 1993. Again, it is 
interesting to note that from Figure 8 it is suggested that the countries with 
the most strict employment protection legislation experience lower 
polarization than other countries.  
Figure 8: Relationship between EPL and the Extent of polarization 
 
 
Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
The work by Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, 
provided a typology of welfare states and claimed the independence from 
the market that welfare states offer to citizens. As emphasised extensively by 
Oesch (2013 and 2015) the book’s argument about the stratifying impact 
welfare states have on post-industrial societies was clearly forward looking. 
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Oesch highlights that Esping-Andersen predicted a variety of future 
employment scenarios for post-industrial societies: 
Different welfare-state/labour market interactions produce different post-
industrial trajectories. They influence not only the rate of growth of services, 
but also the relative emphasis on social-welfare activities as opposed to 
personal services; they influence the skill and occupational composition of the 
labour force (Esping-Andersen, 1990:192) 
 
How wage-setting institutions affect occupational changes  
In Oesch (2013) we have two main views as to what kind of impact 
institutions may have on the occupational structure:  
(i) Krugman (1994) argues that institutions lead among lowly 
educated workers to a trade-off between wages and employment. 
High wage floors and powerful trade unions lead to low growth in 
low-skilled services, high unemployment, low inequality. Whereas 
deregulation leads to job creation in low-end services but higher 
inequality.  
 Setting high wages floors favors the creation of decent jobs but 
leads to weak growth in low-skilled services and to high 
unemployment 
 Deregulation of wage-setting institutions promotes job creation 
in low-end services 
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(ii) The previous view was primarily concerned with the labour supply side, 
whereas for what regards demand, the second view is associated to 
Streeck(1997) and Acemoglu(2003) and asserts that employers opt for a "high 
road" vs "low road" job strategy depending on the institutional 
permissiveness: low-wage, low-skill, low training and low productivity jobs 
vs high-skill and high-productivity (upgrading). 
 
The operationalization of the theoretical premises above can therefore be 
carried out by concentrating on the effect on employment changes of three 
main labour market institutions: employment protection legislation (EPL), 
trade union density and minimum wages.  
The three main hypotheses I am putting forward are:  
H1: EPL insulates insiders which dampens down the routinization effect 
H2: Trade unions resist technology-induced occupational changes 
H3: Minimum wages constrain the growth of low skilled jobs  
3. Data  
This paper employs seven sets of data: the European Union Labour Force 
Survey (EU LFS), the United Kingdom Labour Force Survey (UKLFS), the 
European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), the 
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Routing Task Intensity (RTI) index, the Princeton Data Improvement 
Initiative (PDII) dataset, and the CEP-OECD Institutions Data Set.  
 
European Union Labour Force Survey (EU LFS) 
The European Union Labour Force Survey (EU LFS) is conducted in the 28 
Member States of the European Union, 2 candidate countries and 3 countries 
of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). This dataset is collected 
from the national statistical offices and is currently the best attempt at having 
a comparable cross-country analysis of the European labour force, centrally 
assembled by Eurostat with common classifications and definitions.  
As explained by Eurostat1, the EU LFS consists of a large household sample 
survey providing quarterly results on labour participation of people aged 15 
and over and also those outside the labour force. For these reasons all 
definitions apply to persons aged 15 years and over living in private 
households. The target group of the survey does not include neither those 
carrying out obligatory military or community service, nor persons in 
institutions/collective households. The dataset covers the period from 1983 
onwards and depending on the accession date of each country data is 
                                                        
 
 
 
1 The European Union Labour Force Survey (EU LFS) data description can be found at the 
following link: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/european-union-labour-
force-survey  
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available for them. Each national statistical institute is in charge of the 
selection of the sample, the preparation of the questionnaires, the conduct of 
the direct interviews among households and sending the results to Eurostat 
as required by the common regulation. The harmonisation of the available 
data at the European level is therefore carried out by: 
• using the same concepts and definitions 
• following International Labour Organisation guidelines 
• using common classifications (NACE, ISCO, ISCED, NUTS) 
• recording the same set of characteristics in each country 
In the latest version available, 2015, the quarterly LFS sample size across the 
EU was about 1.6 millions of individuals.  
Following the methodology in Goos et al. (2014) I will restrict my analysis to 
16 European countries and only to the period 1993-2011 (the data availability 
is shorter for some of the countries), since in the previous years there is no 
occupational and industrial information available. I will exploit this dataset 
also to retrieve the occupations’ average education level. In order to make 
this dataset comparable I follow the instructions provided by Goos et al. 
2009. Therefore the annual datasets for the 16 countries are pulled together 
and following the ILO categorization we keep only the employed, dropping 
the employed with no industry (proxied by the NACE major group) and no 
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occupation (2-digit ISCO) codes. All the employees reporting zero or no 
usual weekly hours worked will also be dropped. For two countries, Ireland 
and Italy, the panel is incomplete and therefore we drop some of the time 
periods. In order to obtain an hours-weighted measure of employment I 
aggregate the individual weighting factor to have a combination at the 
country-occupation-industry-year level and once this is obtained I multiply it 
by usual hours worked to obtain an hours-weighted measure of 
employment. This same dataset is also used to obtain the information 
necessary for the education variable which is used only as an alternative 
ranking of occuaptions. This variable is classified according to ISCED and it 
is broken down into three categories: lowest level of education corresponds 
to ISCED 0,1,2 which is pre-primary education, primary and secondary 
education; this is followed by ISCED 3 and 4 which is upper secondary and 
post-secondary non-tertiary education); finally the highest level is 
represented by ISCED 5 and 6 which is tertiary and postgraduate education.  
The second and third set of data, the United Kingdom Labour Force Survey 
(UKLFS) and the European Union Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC) have been used only to retrieve the wage information 
to rank the occupations since the employment data is already contained in 
the EU LFS. Wages are collapsed to the occupation-country-year level using 
the provided sample weights that had been pre-multiplied by hours worked.  
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In order to have an aggregate visualization of these first two datasets by 
country I have plotted the evolution of employment by occupation measures 
over the period 1993-2013 using the EU-LFS and the EU SILC for the wage 
ranking:  
Figure 9: Employment by occupation (1993-2013) – Order based on EU SILC 
wage ranking  
 
The charts in these section cover the period from 1993 to 2013. Occupations 
were ordered based on EU SILC on earnings in 1993 and divided into nine 
main categories, which resemble the classification in the first figure where we 
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had three main blocks: lowest income, middle and high income. The 
distribution ranges from elementary occupations and low-end service 
workers on the far left to professionals and managers at the high end on the 
right. Belgium seems to have experienced increases in employment 
especially at the two poles (except for stagnant employment for the category 
of managers) with a relative decrease of occupations in the middle. 
Luxembourg on the other hand has experienced a pattern closer to 
upgrading with the three high income occupations growing the most. The 
Netherlands seems to have experienced a pattern closer to the classic job 
polarization with a hollowing out of the middle.  
 
Whereas Denmark saw a very high increase in the occupational category of 
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professionals with slight decreases in the middle and an increase of service 
and sales workers at the low end of the distribution. Sweden seems also to 
have witnessed a pattern of upgrading with professionals and managers 
being the drivers of employment growth, but it also experienced decreases of 
clerical work occupations and increases in low-end services.  
Finland saw a dramatic rise in service and sales workers at the low end of the 
distribution with slight decreases in the middle and increases at the high end 
except for the managers category. Norwegian occupational changes on the 
-60%
-40%
-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
Elementary
occupations
Service and
sales workers
Skilled
agricultural,
forestry and
fishery
workers
Craft and
related trades
workers
Plant and
machine
operators and
assemblers
Clerical
support
workers
Technicians
and associate
professionals
Professionals Managers
SWEDEN
-80%
-60%
-40%
-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Elementary
occupations
Service and
sales workers
Skilled
agricultural,
forestry and
fishery
workers
Craft and
related trades
workers
Plant and
machine
operators and
assemblers
Clerical
support
workers
Technicians
and associate
professionals
Professionals Managers
FINLAND
73 
 
other hand have moved towards a major upgrading of the labour force with 
a considerable increase in professionals.  
 
Ireland is another country which has experienced an increase especially at 
the high end of the distribution, with a particular rise in technicians and 
associates, probably due to the large presence of multinationals in the tech 
sector. 
 
Greece in this period saw an increase increases in both service and sales 
workers in the low end of the distribution, with considerable decreases in the 
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middle and increases in the occupations of professionals, technicians and 
associate professionals.  
 
The middle of the distribution in Spain has not experienced significant 
changes throughout this period, with increases instead concentrated among 
two of the high income occupations and among service and sales workers.  
 
Italy experienced a dramatic decrease in skilled agricultural workers in the 
low end of the distribution with decreases also in middle income 
occupations. But the most important rises were concentrated at the top of the 
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occupational distribution, which confirms what we saw in the initial chart in 
Figure 2.  
 
Portugal has seen a major increase in the occupational category of 
professionals, with considerable decreases in the middle of the distribution 
and a rise in elementary occupations.  
 
In the next chart instead we can see that the occupational changes in 
Germany saw increases in technicians, associate professionals and 
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professionals at the top of the distribution and in service and sales workers 
with declines of occupations in the middle.  
A similar pattern can be found in Austria, where professionals also saw the 
largest increase and there was a hollowing out in the middle of the 
occupational distribution.  
 
The last two countries to be analysed are France and the United Kingdom. In 
the first we experience a notable increase in low-income occupations, with 
moderate decreases in the middle and slight increases in the high end of the 
distribution. Finally in the United Kingdom the patterns of the classic job 
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polarization are more recognisable with a hollowing out in the middle and 
growth in both the low and high end of the occupational distribution.  
 
Overall, the service and salers workers category seems to witness consistent 
increases across almost all the countries. A number of explanations can be 
put forward. This can be due to the direct effect of hollowing out affecting 
the most proximate category (through downgrading) which should be 
accompanied also by an impact on wages. On the demand side, the retail and 
services sector may have expanded greatly. The student population and the 
increase in part-time work may have contributed to this increase. Finally, 
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some of the jobs in these category probably required a skill upgrading which 
led to a shift from the middle and also an effect on wages.  
 
Routine Task intensity and Offshoring index 
The fourth dataset, Routine Task Intensity (RTI) index, is based on Autor, 
Levy, and Murnane (2003) and Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006, 2008) and 
reports the measure of routiness of an occupation. The index is mapped into 
the European occupational classification and normalized to have zero mean 
and unit standard deviation.  
 
As explained in Goos et al (2014) the five original DOT task measures are 
combined to produce three task aggregates:  
- Manual task measure corresponds to the DOT variable 
measuring an occupation's demand for "eye-hand-foot 
coordination" 
- Routine task measure is a simple average of two DOT variables, 
"set limits, tolerances and standards" measuring an 
occupation's demand for routine cognitive tasks, and "finger 
dexterity," measuring an occupation's use of routine motor 
tasks;  
- Abstract task measure is the average of two DOT variables: 
"direction control and planning," measuring managerial and 
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interactive tasks, and "GED Math," measur- ing mathematical 
and formal reasoning requirements. 
Then from these three measures the Routine Task Intensity (RTI) index is 
then built as the difference between the log of Routine tasks and the sum of 
the log of Abstract and the log of Manual tasks 
 
The fifth dataset that will be used is the Princeton Data Improvement 
Initiative (PDII) dataset, which will be exploited to provide the information 
for the offshoring variable. This dataset was created by Blinder and 
Krueger(2013) and reports several measures of offshorability, from the news 
reports to professional coders’ assessments. Data from actual instances of 
offshoring of European companies as measured by the European 
Restructuring Monitor (ERM) are recorded. The fact sheets provided by the 
ERM measure a large set of key information on the offshoring events up to 
which occupations are being offshored. The processing of these fact sheets 
allows the construction of an index of actual offshoring by occupation. The 
robustness of this index is verified by regreessing these measures of actual 
offshoring by occupation on Blinder and Krueger's (2013) preferred measure 
of an occupation's offshorability, which leads to a positive and strong 
correlation. Goos et al. (2014) actually show that there is great variation in the 
explanatory power of these competing indices of an occupation's 
offshorability used in the literature. With a crosswalk file I extract the 
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information concerning the occupations that were being offshored. The 
number of cases are counted and categorized by the ISCO occupations, 
which then gives the final offshorability rank.  
 
CEP-OECD Institutions 
The last dataset that I am going to employ is the CEP-OECD Institutions 
dataset, which was not used in Goos et al.(2014) since no role for institutions 
was included in their analysis. To understand how labour market institutions 
have evolved from 1993 to 2011 the Center for Economic Perfomance and the 
OECD have developed a common dataset for twenty OECD countries. 
However their data coverage differs depending on the variable and country 
chosen. Also, I have had to update all the measures of labour market 
institutions from 2006 onwards. From this dataset I am going to exploit the 
variables belonging to the following sections: Employment Protection, Union 
Density, Minimum wage (an additional institutional measure which was 
used is Bargaining Coordination and Centralization but was not included in 
the final specifications but details can be found in the Appendix). In 
particular I will be exploiting the following measures to be interacted with 
the index of routinization: 
 
- epl: Employment protection legislation data from the OECD 
labour market statistics database using version 1 of the 
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indicator: the strictness of employment protection legislation. 
Scale from 0 (least stringent) to 2 (most restrictive). The 
indicators of employment protection are synthetic indicators of 
the strictness of regulation on dismissals and the use of 
temporary contracts. For each year, indicators refer to 
regulation in force on the 1st of January2. 
 
- udnet(%): Union density is Union membership/Employment 
and was calculated using administrative and survey data from 
the OECD labour market statistics database. This is the ratio 
of  wage and salary earners that are trade union members, 
divided by the total number of wage and salary earners (as 
explained in the OECD Labour Force Statistics). Density is 
calculated using survey data, wherever possible, and 
administrative data adjusted for non-active and self-employed 
members otherwise3. 
 
                                                        
 
 
 
2 For further details and full methodology: 
http://www.oecd.org/employment/emp/oecdindicatorsofemploymentprotection.htm 
3 For more information and full methodology: 
http://www.oecd.org/employment/emp/UnionDensity_Sourcesandmethods.pdf  
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- Real minimum wage, minw_med and minw_mean: I adopt the 
three usual measures for the minimum wage.  Firstly, real 
hourly and annual minimum wages are statutory minimum 
wages converted into a common hourly and annual pay 
period for the countries for which they are available. The 
resulting estimates are deflated by national Consumer Price 
Indices (CPI). The data are then converted into a common 
currency unit using US $ Purchasing Power Parities (PPPs) for 
private consumption expenditures. In order to allow for cross-
country comparisons, data on minimum wage levels are 
further supplemented with another measure of minimum 
wages relative to average wages, that is, the ratio of minimum 
wages to median earnings of full-time employees. Median 
rather than mean earnings provide a better basis for 
international comparisons as it accounts for differences in 
earnings dispersion across countries. However, while median 
of basic earnings of full-time workers - i.e. excluding overtime 
and bonus payments - are, ideally, the preferred measure of 
average wages for international comparisons of minimum-to-
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median earnings, they are not available for a large number of 
countries. Minimum relative to mean earnings of full-time 
workers are also provided4. 
 
Furthermore to make sure that other labour market developments are not 
driving my results I have decided to provide a diagrammatic visualization of 
some the crucial variables that influence the employment structure patterns 
in the period covered by my research work which you can find represented 
below, taking also into account the data assembled for the evolution in the 
employment rate: Unemployment rate by country, Labour force participation 
rate and Employment/Population Ratio. 
 
Figure 10: Unemployment rate by country 
                                                        
 
 
 
4 Methodological specificities can be found at: 
http://www.oecd.org/employment/emp/Minimum-wages.pdf  
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Figure 11: LFP rate and Employment/Population Ratio 
RED: Labour Force Participation Rate  BLUE:Employment/Population Ratio 
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4. Empirical Framework  
The main specification used in Goos et al. (2014) assumes that the effects of 
technological change are the same for all countries. The authors regress the 
log of employment in occupation-country-year cells onto occupation-specific 
task measures and offshorability. Furthermore they control for the country-
occupation-year specific log wage and country-occupation and country-year 
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dummies. All these measures are standardized in order to make their 
impacts comparable. The clustering of standard errors is done at the 
occupation-industry-country level.  
The model being estimated is therefore the following:  
 
lnhwcoeff = β0 + β1RTI + β2 OFF + i.ict + i.ijc +  
 
Where the dependant variable lnhwcoeff is the change in log employment 
regressed on RTI and OFF which stand respectively for routinization and 
offshorability. The regressions includes occupation-industry-country fixed 
effects and industry-country-year fixed effects. As written above, standard 
errors are clustered by occupation-industry-country. 
What I intend to perform resembles the approach given above but includes 
an interaction role for three institutional variables: epl, union density and 
minimum wages (also these three measures are standardized in order to make 
their impacts comparable). 
The model I am going to estimate changes into: 
 
lnhwcoeff = β0 + β1RTI + β2 OFF + β3 EPL + β4 UD + β5 MW + γ1RTI_EPL +  
γ2RTI_UD + γ3RTI_MW  + i.c + i.t + i.ijc +  
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Obviously this specification has required some further adjustments: I needed 
to introduce country and year fixed effects separately in order to obtain 
country-specific idiosyncratic variation at the year level. This allows me to 
include my institutional variables, which would have otherwise been 
absorbed by the country-year dummies.  
 
5. Results and Discussion 
The results reported in the Table 2 below therefore are based on the revised 
specification above estimating the drivers of our dependent variable, 
lnhwcoeff, change in log employment which accounts for employment growth 
on routinization and offshoring, columns (1) and (2), on our three labour 
market institutions, column (3), on the individual interactions of these 
institutions with the routinization variable, columns (4)-(6) and on a full 
interactions model in column (7).    
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Table 2:  
Explaining 
employment 
polarization with a 
revised model to 
account for labour 
market institutions 
and their 
interaction with 
routinization.  
 
 
 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent  variable  
(lnhwcoeff) Baseline Baseline  Institutions 
Routinization* 
EPL 
Routinization* 
Union Density 
Routinization* 
MinWage  All interactions 
Routinization (rti) -0.176*** -0.160*** -0.113***         
 
(0.0201) (0.0200) (0.0270) 
    Offshoring (off) 0.645*** 0.533*** 0.557*** 
    
 
(0.0250) (0.0278) (0.0338) 
    Employment protection 
legislation (epl) 
  
-0.0468 
    
   
(0.0849) 
    Union density (ud) 
  
-0.00566 
    
   
(0.00944) 
    Minimum wage (mw) 
  
4.33e-05 
    
   
(4.29e-05) 
    rti_epl 
   
0.181*** 
  
0.176*** 
    
(0.0601) 
  
(0.0418) 
rti_ud 
    
0.00330 
 
-0.00726 
     
(0.00397) 
 
(0.00722) 
rti_mw 
     
-1.35e-05 -1.03e-05 
      
(1.61e-05) (1.97e-05) 
Constant 5.718*** 3.771*** 3.898*** 5.209*** 4.956*** 2.137*** 2.189*** 
 
(0.0955) (0.105) (0.648) (0.220) (0.192) (0.140) (0.421) 
Observations 17,041 17,041 8,371 16,113 17,041 9,299 8,371 
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Industry-Country-Year FE No Yes Yes No No No No 
Ind-Occ-Country & Ind-
Country-Year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.219 0.471 0.465 0.685 0.700 0.746 0.727 
R2_adj 0.218 0.469 0.463 0.663 0.679 0.728 0.707 
Robust standard errors in 
parentheses  
       *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
       Clustered at Country-Year 
level 
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The results in Table 1 reveal some very interesting patterns. It is important to 
bear in mind that for all columns standard errors have been clustered at the 
country-year level. Clustering at this level allows the residuals of the 
observations from the same country-year to be correlated.  
Let’s start from column (1) which is our baseline scenario with only 
routinization and offshoring operating in which I run a specification with 
country and year fixed effects. Routinization as in Goos et al(2014) is confirmed 
to have a significant negative effective on the change in employment growth, 
whereas offshoring which was not significant in the specification is here 
positive and significant. In column (2) I run the same specification but here I 
apply a finer degree of fixed effects, introducing industry-country-year fixed 
effects. The magnitudes are reduced but the direction and significance of the 
effect is maintained. The offshorability variable shows a positive coefficient 
which is counterintuitive but it may signal some kind of race between 
routinization and offshorability.  Column (3) was introduced for completeness, 
but we are interested in the interaction effect rather than these institutional 
variables in isolation, therefore we move to the analysis of the results in 
columns (4) to (6) where the interactions have been analysed separately and 
finally in column (7) where all of the interactions have been performed. These 
specifications have been run with industry-occupation-country and industry-
occupation-country fixed effects, therefore both routinization and offshoring 
and our institutional variables in isolation are dropped. Looking at the 
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interactions we have a series of interesting results. Firstly and most 
importantly, when routinization, which had a significant negative effect on 
employment growth, interacts with employment protection legislation the 
coefficient is not only significant but the sign of the interaction becomes positive 
which suggests that EPL effectively mitigates the impact of routinization on the 
employment structures. Column (5) instead proceeds to run a specification in 
which another institution, trade union density, is interacted with routinization. 
The coefficient of this interaction effect has a much smaller magnitude, but most 
importantly the interaction between routinization and trade union density 
results not to be significant. An additional test was run using the co_oecd, a 
measure of coordination in the bargaining framework and this also leads to  
similar results. Column (6) instead performs the interaction between the 
routinization factor and the minimum wage. The magnitude of this interaction 
effect is extremely small and the coefficient is also not significant. The results 
are unvaried when I use any of the three measures of minimum wage 
mentioned above. Also another important thing to highlight is that when the 
interaction with the minimum wage is added the number of observations 
drops, due to the fact that this labour market institution is in place only in 
certain countries in my sample. This is another reason why we want to look at 
the three interactions together, to see whether the interaction coefficient of 
routinization and EPL remains significant in the restricted sample for this 
information on the minimum wage is available.  If we look at the last column, 
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column (7), where all the interactions have been performed we notice that the 
coefficient for the interaction between routinization and employment protection 
legislation is still significant and positive, confirming that the routinization 
effect is damped down when interacted with employment protection 
legislation. Also in this case the interaction with union density is not significant, 
the same for the minimum wage which delivers a non-significant coefficient. A 
further note concerns the explanatory power R2 of the different specifications I 
have run which increases significantly as we move to the right of the table. It 
definitely increases because of the many fixed effects which have been added, 
but notice that also the adjusted measure increases, so that it is not the whole 
story and the interaction with the institutional variables does carry explanatory 
power.  
I carry out a number of robustness checks to show that my results are not 
driven by a particular industry, a single country or a particular year, they all 
confirm the results from the specifications above. Also when I apply linear or 
quadratic time trends to my specifications the results held.  
Let’s now move to the discussion of the results against the hypotheses we put 
forward in the operalisation carried out above:   
- Hypothesis H1 stated that EPL insulates insiders which dampens 
down the routinization effect. This seems to be confirmed by my 
results. Job polarization operates through routinization, but this 
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effect is mitigated by employment protection legislation. A higher 
strictness of regulation on dismissals and on the use of temporary 
contracts thus constrains the job polarization patterns, and 
making the hollowing out of the labour market more subdued.   
- Hypothesis H2 stated that Trade unions resist technology-induced 
occupational changes. From my results I don’t find evidence for 
trade unions resisting the routinization effect. It may be that trade 
unions dampen the effect of firing within a firm, thus the slightly 
positive coefficient, however we could have entire firms going 
bankrupt because of automation therefore the interaction effect 
between routinization and trade unions becomes not significant.  
- The last hypothesis H3 affirmed that Minimum wages constrain the 
growth of low skilled jobs. From the evidence provided minimum 
wages do not seem to exert a significant effect on job polarization 
patterns when interacted with routinization. This may be because 
minimum wages affect in particular low-skilled interpersonal 
service jobs which are usually difficult to automate and outsource.  
 
When adding the three interactions together, the only significant interaction 
keeps being the one of employment protection legislation with routinization. 
This suggests that employment protection legislation, minimum wages and 
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unionization are capturing different features of labour market institutions that 
do not overlap with each other. 
The results in the table thus seem to go in the direction of labour market 
institutions, in particular employment protection legislation, constraining the 
effect of routinization and therefore delivering job polarization patterns which 
are heterogenous across countries, rather than a uniform phenomenon as 
evidenced by Goos et al. (2009, 2014).  
 
6. Conclusions 
For Manning (2004) when looking at the evolution of the labour market over the 
course of time, it is clear that the creation and advancement of new technologies 
has had a multi-dimensional impact on said market. In particular, technological 
innovation has altered both the general demand for work and the types of tasks 
carried out by humans, thus affecting also the specific demand for certain types 
of labour. The view that the development of new technologies will in turn lead 
to an increase in the demand of skilled labour is widely accepted. Nonetheless, 
the demand for less skilled labour may arguably grow as a consequence of 
technological transformation. However, one must note, that the employment of 
the less-skilled workers may significantly depend upon their proximity to the 
highly qualified labour force.  
The so-called “routinization” hypothesis proffered by Autor, Levy, and 
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Murnane was endorsed by Goos, Maarten, and Manning (2007) as a more 
plausible explanation for the increase in job polarization in the United Kingdom 
between 1975 and 2007. In fact, the authors refute the idea that a skill-biased 
technical change may account for the increase in labour-market shares of the 
highest and lowest paying professions.  
This paper has argued that routinization remains the most plausible 
determinant of occupational changes over the last three decades, but that a role 
for labour market institutions needs to be accounted for. In a similar fashion to 
Oesch (2015) (see the Appendix for further evidence of his work) despite it is 
still difficult to assert whether technological change leads to upgrading or 
polarization, as long as the extent to which companies have access to similar 
types of technology, European countries should be affected in a similar way, 
however even if we consider routinization as the main driver for common 
trends in occupational change across countries, this leads only to a partial 
explanation of the causes of cross-country variation. A broader focus on 
institutions and a comparative research design approach which looks at how 
welfare regimes affect employment structures is needed and this is the gap this 
paper has tried to address by focusing on the contribution of three main labour 
market institutions - employment protection legislation, union density and 
minimum wages – in their interaction with routinization.  
The main specifications contained in the empirical section reveal how the 
coefficient for our measure of routinization has the expected negative sign, 
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however when we interact it with the employment protection legislation 
variable we can see that its coefficient turns positive which seems to suggest 
that EPL does reduce the extent of routinization in a particular country, thus 
mitigating the hollowing out in the middle of the employment structure. This 
may be due to the fact that when we are in a regime with a high strictness of 
employment protection, the regulation on jobs which are affected by 
automation prevents an easy dismissal. Moreover, the constrains on the use of 
temporary contracts limit the potential of job polarization to occur by 
constraining job growth at the low end of the distribution where the use of 
more flexible forms of work, such as zero-hours contract or similar, is more 
frequent. With employers more unable to resort to such types of contracts, we 
may see a subdued hollowing out behaviour in the middle of the employment 
structure.  
The paper has also analysed the interaction of routinization with union density 
testing the hypothesis that trade unions would resist technology-induced 
occupational changes, but this has not revealed a significant pattern. It may be 
that trade unions resist change at the level of the individual companies by 
dampening the effect of firing and maintaining employment levels, however we 
cannot exclude that entire firms are made redundant because of the 
introduction of a new technology which makes the operations of a particular 
firm redundant. Therefore when if we have entire firms going bankrupt 
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because of automation the interaction effect between routinization and trade 
unions becomes not significant.  
In my last hypothesis I conjecture that minimum wages constrain the growth of 
low skilled jobs. The evidence I provide uses three different measures of 
minimum wages and they all show that no significant effect is exerted on job 
polarization patterns when minimum wages are interacted with routinization.  
My results therefore show that both the labour market institution of trade 
unions and minimum wages have only a limited capacity to influence job 
polarization patterns, whereas employment protection legislation could 
effectively mitigate the effects of routinization.  
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PAPER II 
The Routinization of Labour 
Market Reforms 
 
 
Abstract 
Does job polarization have a feedback effect on labour market institutions 
and policies, so that different degrees of polarization lead to different 
articulations of institutions at the domestic level, thus reinforcing or 
altering differences in national models across the European space? This 
paper is aimed at establishing whether there is a relationship between the 
extent of polarization exhibited by each European country and their 
specific labour market reform processes. The analysis finds that the job 
polarization experienced by a particular country in the 5 years before the 
reform instance is consistently among the strongest predictors of reform 
activity, as significant as other drivers such as GDP growth and 
government net debt. Moreover a higher degree of polarization tends to 
be associated with more deregulation and a decrease in the generosity of 
the policy measure. Finally, the empirical framework is tested against 
more conventional taxonomies of welfare capitalism (Esping-Andersen 
and VoC) revealing how both the continental and liberal regimes have 
been profoundly affected by job polarization. 
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1. Introduction 
The main aim of my previous paper was to investigate the evolution of 
employment patterns in the European labour markets over the period 1993-
2011 and attempt to show that, although the routinization hypothesis remains 
the most plausible cause of job polarization, it is the peculiar type of 
institutional framework that ultimately shapes the distinctive patterns that can 
be observed. Based on the analysis of the European Labour Force 
Survey(EULFS) data, it extended the empirical framework in Goos, Manning 
and Salomons(2014) by testing the joint effect of technology and labour market 
institutions on occupational structures. The evidence provided suggests that the 
claim of a pervasive technology-induced polarization must be revised in order 
to comprise a role for the institutional component.  
However, technological, social and labour market change are often viewed as 
interdependent: labour market institutions affect occupational structures, but at 
the same time the push from technical change is seen as outpacing the 
capability of labour market institutions to respond. This paper therefore sets to 
explore the other direction of causality with the aim to establish whether there 
is a relationship between the extent of polarization exhibited by each European 
country and their specific labour market reform process and choice of labour 
market institutions. In particular, this paper will try to provide an answer to the 
following questions: Does job polarization have a feedback effect on labour 
market institutions and policies, so that different degrees of polarization lead to 
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different articulations of institutions at the domestic level, thus reinforcing or 
altering differences in national models across the European space? The paper 
employs introduces a fairly innovative empirical approach which consists in 
mapping the lagged indices of polarization calculated on an annual basis from 
the EU-LFS dataset with the institutional component provided by LABREF, the 
database of EU labour market reforms over the period 2000-2013 managed by 
the EU Commission in cooperation with the Employment Committee(EMCO) 
and the Social Reforms database created by the fRDB and IZA, which collects 
information about social reforms in the EU15 countries over the period 1980-
2007. 
The main hypothesis is that many European countries faced with the risk of 
losing their competitive edge economically became more prone to reform their 
labour markets and put in place a set of institutions that would more flexibly 
accommodate the changes brought by technology in the occupational and social 
structures. Therefore the test that will be performed is whether those countries 
exhibiting higher indices of polarization and that saw the highest drop in 
manufacturing as employment share in the total economy were also marked, 
although with a lag, by significant changes in the path of labour market 
reforms.  
Evidence suggests that European governments have in several instances 
participated effectively in addressing the changes emerging as society moves 
from being a production-and-material based to an information-services based 
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system and that technological change has played an important role in shaping 
the path of social and labour market reforms, although a uniform picture 
cannot be drawn. The political economy channel at the core of the analysis sees 
a decreased bargaining power of trade unions due to the hollowing out of their 
power base (particularly relevant for manufacturing) translated into a 
weakened intermediating effect in the labour market reform process. The 
decrease in concerted power thus reflects into an increased reform activity, a 
move towards deregulation and a decrease in the generosity of the policy 
measures. 
 
 
2. Literature Review on the Determinants of Labour Market 
Reforms 
Having established that the structure of the labour market institutions must 
evolve alongside technological progress and the ever changing structure of 
markets, the elevated complexity of the subject renders a single universal 
solution ineffective. Nonetheless, in their work, Nickell and Layard (1999) focus 
on outlining the factors which are shared by most successful reforms. In 
particular, the authors argue that successful reform of labour market 
institutions must address both the macro and the micro issues. As noted by 
Adascalitei and Morano (2015), although the literature on the macroeconomic 
factors affecting labour market reforms is quite recent and generally focused on 
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developed economies, there is some consensus around such determinants. As 
noted by Bernal-Verdugo et al. (2012), these comprise a range of 
macroeconomic (initial labour market and output growth conditions, size of the 
economy in question, degree of trade openness, exchange rate regime, fiscal 
conditions) and political variables (ideology of the executive, extent to which 
the political power is more or less decentralised, political stability, and election 
cycles). The literature discussed below uses, by and large, a combination of 
these explanatory variables. 
A number of studies, including Turrini et al. (2015), Duval and Elmeskov 
(2006), and Bernal-Verdugo et al. (2012) looked at the extent to which 
governments were more likely to implement labour market reforms during 
economic crises. 
Using the same data source that this paper relies upon, Turrini et al. (2015) 
assessed the determinants of labour market reforms in the European Union 
over the period 2000-2011. An exploratory analysis conducted by the authors 
using unemployment rate in conjunction with the number of labour market 
reforms revealed that: i) there was some positive correlation between 
unemployment and the number of reforms implemented; and ii) the timing of 
the policy response differed across countries, whereby in some cases an 
increase in reform action occurred after the increase in unemployment, 
compared to instances where reforms anticipated periods of unemployment. In 
addition to unemployment rate, the authors also found a number of additional 
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correlations using measures such as income per capita, GDP growth, debt and 
fiscal stance; in particular, the authors found that: i) “unsatisfactory” labour 
market outcomes were correlated with more intense reform activity; ii) reforms 
were more frequent in countries with segmented labour markets; iii) reforms 
appeared to be less frequent where there was a higher growth rate; and iv) 
countries with both a high government debt and deficit seemed, on average, 
more prone to implement reforms. Finally – and most importantly from an 
empirical perspective – the authors focused on three specific policy domains 
(i.e., labour taxation, unemployment benefits, and employment protection 
legislation)  to account for the heterogeneity of reforms, and performed a 
regression analysis to measure the effect of selected labour market outcomes, 
macroeconomic conditions, and existing policy settings on both total reforms 
across all the domains, and separately on a measure of reforms specific to each 
policy stance. The authors found that reform activism was stronger in countries 
with lower GDP per capita and long-standing EU membership, under critical 
economic and labour market conditions, and where political costs were low. 
The direction of reforms was affected by economic and labour market 
conditions, available fiscal space, and by initial policy settings. 
Looking at 21 counties over the period 1985-2003, Duval and Elmeskov (2006) 
found similar results to Turrini et al. (2015). In particular, their analysis shows 
that structural reforms were strengthened by a number of factors, such as high 
levels of unemployment, periods of crisis, healthy public finances, reforms in 
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other policy fields, and small country size. Furthermore, the authors found that 
countries pursuing fixed exchange-rate regimes or participating in monetary 
unions – which, by definition, had little or no monetary autonomy – appeared 
to undertake less reforms. Such findings appear to go in the same direction as 
those presented by Duval (2008), who found that sound public finances and 
fiscal expansion stimulated reforms. 
Using a sample of 97 countries over the period 1980–2008, Bernal-Verdugo et al. 
(2012) found that: i) pre-existing level of the labour market institutions played a 
key role in determining whether or not there was a change in labour market 
institutions. In particular, the authors found that the higher the quality of the 
existing labour market institutions, the less likely a country is to implement a 
reform; and ii) as one would expect, a favourable economic situation lowers the 
probability of a change in policy. Conversely, the authors found that the effect 
of other macroeconomic and demographic factors, including delayed 
unemployment rates, was not statistically significant. In terms of political 
variables, the authors found that an increase in the degree of decentralization 
(i.e., presidential system vs. one where the president is elected by the assembly) 
played the most important role in increasing the probability of changes in 
labour market institutions. As the authors themselves pointed out, although 
this finding is consistent with Dabrowski and Gortat (2002),  it contrasts with 
Alesina et al., (2006), who concluded that strong governments (i.e., presidential 
systems and unified governments with a large majority of the party in office), 
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alongside the beginning of term of office of a new government, periods of crisis, 
and instances when the executive faced less constraints, were more likely to 
impact on the implementation of fiscal and inflation stabilization programs. 
Finally, the authors found that the length of time during which the chief 
executive’s party had been in power had a negative effect on changes in labour 
market institutions. 
When looking at the labour and product markets of OECD countries, the 
question of what factors may influence and bring about institutional and policy 
reform arises. Høj J. et al. (2006)  considered the main political economy drivers 
of structural policy changes in OECD countries’ labour and product markets 
over the periods 1985-2003 and 1973-2003. First, the authors distinguish 
between two macro categories of political economy drivers: those which are 
extraneous to the political process and thus are not controlled by governments, 
and those on which governments may exercise some influence. The study 
highlights how those factors which are exogenous to the political realm, such as 
foreign competition, duration in office of governments, and cycles of economic 
crises, play an important role when it comes to implementing structural reform. 
Differently, key players which may be subject to governmental leverage, 
including policy spillovers from the product market to the labour market and 
the status of the public budget, could both spark reform and support it. The 
authors thus noted that, while some of the drivers are not in the governments’ 
control, others fall within the governments’ remit. Their analysis suggests that 
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the former set of factors (i.e., economic crises, exposure to foreign competition, 
and government’s duration in office) had an important influence on the 
implementation of structural reforms. Nonetheless, the latter set of factors – 
which included budgetary conditions and spillovers across policy areas – were 
also important to both implement and sustain reforms. Interestingly, the 
authors noted that the influence of new technologies – measured by the authors 
as the investment made in information and communication technology – was, 
in principle, seen as a factor capable of influencing the implementation of 
structural reforms; however, their empirical work revealed that this variable 
was not statistically significant. 
More recently, Adascalitei and Morano (2015)  looked at the determinants (and 
effects) of reforms of EPL using both developed and developing economies 
between 2008 and 2014. As the authors themselves noted, previous studies 
tended to concentrate on developed economies, for which data availability was 
not an issue. As a result, limited evidence had been gathered on the 
determinants of labour market reforms (or better, labour market regulation) in 
developing economies (see Campos and Nugent (2012)  and Bernal-Verdugo et 
al. (2014)). Using a measure of reform intensity, which doffered from the 
dependent variable used in the abovementioned literature on developing 
economies, the authors found that: i) in developed economies, reforms were 
mostly meant to relax labour regulation and were driven by high 
unemployment rates and low levels of GDP growth; ii) in contrast, in 
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developing economies reforms tended to increase workers’ protection, and 
were more likely to occur in countries experiencing high levels of GDP growth 
– while not being sensitive to unemployment rates.  
Aimed at addressing the issue of increased unemployment across Europe, the 
1994 OECD Jobs Strategy paved the way for subsequent labour market reform. 
However, in introducing changes to the labour market on both an institutional 
and a policy level, not every country was equally successful. In their work, 
Bassanini and Duval (2006) set out to analyse the effects that new policies and 
institutions had on the aggregate level of employment. Differently from 
previous works, this analysis is grounded in up-to-date information on OECD 
policies and institutions and takes into account previously ignored issues such 
as how policies and institutions interact with each other, how is economic 
resistance to macroeconomic alterations affected by policies and institutions, 
and what impact does product market regulation have. Finding that nearly 
two-thirds of unemployment that is not linked to alterations of the economic 
cycle can be explained by policy and institutional reform, the authors support 
the thesis that indeed, regulations and institutions play a key role in shaping 
the labour market. At the same time, however, the state of the economy also has 
an impact on employment and certain combinations of policies create a 
stronger, more beneficial effect when implemented contemporarily. 
Belot and Van Ours (2004) argue that during the 1990s the majority of OECD 
countries battled against persistently increasing unemployment rates. In order 
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to contrast such raising rates of unemployment many countries adopted 
institutional reforms, some more successful than others. A thorough analysis of 
the existing relationship between unemployment rates and labour market 
institutions (LMI) reveals that specific combinations of LMIs are responsible for 
lowering the aggregate rate of unemployment. In fact, OECD countries which 
resulted more successful in lowering unemployment rates had adopted a 
number of institutional reforms tackling different labour market institutions 
such as employment protection, labour taxes, bargaining power of labour 
unions, and unemployment benefits.  
Chor and Freeman (2005) exploit the 2004 Global Labour Survey (GLS), an 
internet-based survey which sought to collect data and analyze the state of the 
labour market in several countries. More specifically, unlike other studies, the 
survey focuses on concrete labour practices rather than labour regulations. The 
findings show that in countries characterized by higher income equality and 
higher level of income per capita practices favorable to workers are more likely 
to occur.  
A widespread view among economists, is that the structure of labour market 
institutions is the result of a rent seeking process whereby incumbent 
employees leverage on their political influence in order to impose increasingly 
rigid labour markets, benefitting themselves at the detriment of outsiders.  
A number of authors has taken this perspective in trying to identify the key 
determinants of labour market institutions. For instance, Saint-Paul (2014) 
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conducted an empirical investigation whose results were consistent with this 
view. He found that high exposition to unemployment risk among the 
employed leads to more flexible labour markets, as insiders anticipate the 
possibility of becoming outsiders in the short run. Likewise, lower 
unemployment benefits were associated with increased reactiveness of 
employment levels to wage variations. Finally, he showed that both high levels 
of unemployment and the presence of right-wing governments (which tend to 
be less susceptible to trade union demands) explain reductions in minimum 
wage growth.  
A similar perspective was taken by Rueda (2007), who focused instead on the 
determinants of active labour markets policies. Perhaps counterintuitively, he 
showed that left wing parties tend to shun policies aimed at bringing more 
people into the labour market, as these may undermine higher wages for core 
workers, that tend to constitute their electoral basis. However, a paper by 
Bonoli (2010) that considered the significant heterogeneity in Active Labour 
Market Policies thus showed a more nuanced picture.  
Taking into account the more recent trends of the European labour market 
reforms, in particular those measures which were implemented between 2000 
and 2011, Bonfiglioli and Gancia (2011) offer new insights as to the relation 
between macroeconomic cycles and institutional and regulatory changes to the 
labour market. Specifically, the authors note that the economic crisis of 2008 
prompted a number of changes on a policy-level that focused primarily on 
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restructuring sectors of the labour market with a widespread effect. 
Employment protection legislation, setting of wages, and regulation of 
unemployment benefits are some examples of the macro areas on which post-
2008 labour reforms focused. Furthermore, the authors noted a positive 
correlation between adoption of labour market reform in a certain country and 
the existence, in that country, of a high fiscal pressure on labour accompanied 
by unsatisfactory outcomes of the labour market. Such correlation was 
supported by econometric evidence which shows that following fiscal and 
labour benefit reforms the unemployment rate tends to decrease.  
Some authors such as Agell (2002) questioned the dominant perspective on the 
determinants of labour market reforms labelling it as incomplete. In his article 
Agell, argued that unions, job protection and egalitarian pay structures may not 
solely be the result the result of rent seeking, but rather be a form of social 
insurance of otherwise uninsurable risks. By reviewing historical and empirical 
evidence, Agell identifies the absence of markets for insurance against labour 
income risk as the market failure motivating the emergence of rigid labour 
markets, thus operating a significant change of perspective on the nature of 
European labour market institutions.  
Finally looking at technological innovation as a key determinant Gries et al. (2017) ask 
to what extent does technological innovation affect economic development and, in 
particular, could technological advancement lead to economic growth and in turn 
increase social welfare? In order to answer this fundamental question three basic 
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queries must be first addressed. Firstly, what factors lead to technological development 
and what potential benefits may said development bring? Secondly, what impact could 
the aforementioned benefits have? Thirdly, is participation in the gains which derive 
from innovation symmetric or asymmetric and what factors influence this result? 
According to the results of the studies there is a key difference between developed 
countries (DCs) and less developed countries (LDCs). In fact, while the former 
countries rely on technological development in order to advance economically, the 
latter partake in the benefits through the transfer of new technologies. Not only does 
the participation in gains differ greatly between DCs and LDCs, but it also presents 
asymmetric distribution among various groups. Factors such as supply of labour, 
power structures in global value chains, outsourcing, and the malfunctioning of 
government and institutions all play a role in determining the distribution of economic 
gains brought about by technological advancements. 
Gallie (2017) argues that with innovation playing such an important role in the 
economic growth of advanced economies, the question of how the labour market will 
evolve over time in said societies must also be addressed. To this regard, over the past 
thirty years three different points of view have been proposed. The optimistic scenario, 
which is grounded in the assumption that competition-driven technological innovation 
will require an increasingly skilled workforce, sees the expansion of employment and 
an increment in the level of the quality of work overall. On the contrary, a more 
pessimistic view details the probable negative effects new technologies may bring to 
the quality of work. In detail, according to this theory, new technologies will 
complement tasks requiring a high level of skill while alienating more repetitive, less-
skilled tasks. In the long run this will lead to a polarization of skills and, 
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contemporarily, to the displacement of jobs pertaining to the middle and low skilled 
category of work. The third, more recent, point of view dismisses the assumptions 
outlined in the previous two points and insists instead that an increase in competition 
in the labour market brought about by technological advancements will not affect the 
structure or the quality of employment. A historical study of labour market structures 
will on the other hand reveal that institutional intervention will serve as a mitigating 
mechanism to alter the effects new production techniques will have on the labour 
market structure.  
 
3. Theory and Hypotheses 
Let’s start with some very suggestive evidence linking labour market reforms to 
the hollowing out in the European labour markets. In the graph on the left 
below you can observe the share of reforms targeted at reducing the wedge 
between the marginal productivity of labour and its opportunity cost in the 
period 1985 to 2006. As you can see this share is increasing over time and it is 
mostly due to competitive pressures of different nature (e.g. product market 
competition). However it is helpful to compare this with the graph on the right 
which is derived from the OECD STAN indicators and suggests that in the 
same period, manufacturing as employment share in the total economy has 
been drastically decreasing.  
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Figure 12: Share of reforms decreasing the wedge and european manufacturing 
as employment share in total economy  
                    
The second piece of evidence comes instead from the application by to Europe 
which analyses how susceptible jobs are to computerisation. As we can observe 
from the figure below, the northern countries feature low computerisation risk 
levels while this risk increases as we move south. Can this finding be reconciled 
with labour market reforms which favoured technological change? 
Figure 13: Bruegel elabouration of the Frey and Osborne (2013) data on 
computerisation 
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Core political economy channel  
 
In the Appending I provide a detailed description of how the bargaining 
framework is altered by technological innovation. However, routinization has 
major reverberations which extend beyond the employer-trade union 
relationship. The core political economy channel through which job 
polarization thus becomes a fundamental determinant in the process of labour 
market reform can be represented by a reduced-form stages model which 
analyses the relationship between the lagged polarization level and the reform 
pace. The underlying mechanism is that increasing polarization tilts the balance 
of power away from trade unions (since their constituency is the one most 
affected by routinization) allowing an acceleration in reforms that were 
previously blocked.  
Technological innovation leads to a fall in manufacturing as a share of 
employment in the total economy which in turn reflects into an erosion of trade 
union power and their privileged interest representation. Trade unions thus 
face a decreased bargaining power not only at the firm level but also their 
intermediating role is severely weakened. This in turn reflects in the political 
and legislative bodies where it is likely that we will see an increased reform 
activity, a higher degree of deregulation and decreased generosity of policy 
measures. The next diagrammatic visualization provides a summary of this 
mechanism and the hypotheses that follow from it: 
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Figure 14: Reduced-form stages model for job polarization as a driver of labour market reform 
 
 
Hypothesis 1: The erosion of privileged interest representation and a weakened power of intermediation translate into a heightened intensity of 
labour market reforms  
 
Hypothesis 2: The erosion of privileged interest representation and a weakened power of intermediation translate into a higher degree of 
deregulation and decreased generosity of policy measures 
 
Hypothesis 3: LMEs are polarization consistent leading to a lower pressure to reform  
 
Hypothesis 4: CMEs are polarization incompatible leading to an increased reform activity  
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4. Data  
Construction of the Polarization Indices  
The polarization indices rely on the EU-LFS data from the previous paper, 
however for this paper I exploit the full extent of the information from the 
ILO October Enquiries on earnings. Indices are calculated by ranking 
occupations according to the average wage which varies by country rather 
than using only the UK wage ranking as done in Goos et al.(2009). Once all 
occupations have been raked according to average wage Goos et al.(2007) 
run a quadratic regression of employment growth rates by wage percentile 
and the curvature of the U will be a measure of the magnitude of 
polarization since it only depends on the parameter of the squared term thus 
demonstrating robustness with regards to the data and definitions. However, 
as explained by Dauth(2014) in his analysis of job polarization on German 
local labour markets, a close alternative which accounts for how well the U 
fits to the data, is the t-ratio of the quadratic term, which will represent my 
first polarization measure called de   
trank2 = βrank2 / (σ / [SSTrank2(1-p(rank; rank2)2)]1/2) = (βrank2/ σ)c 
Where βrank2 is the estimated coefficient of the quadratic term, SSTrank2 its total 
sum of squares, p(rank; rank2) its correlation coefficient with the level term, 
and σ the standard error of the regression. The denominator of the last 
fraction is a constant c. The t-ratio will therefore depend only on the 
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curvature of the regression curve (βrank2) and its fit to the data (σ). As 
highlighted by Dauth(2014) the main advantage of this straightforward 
measure is that it allows for a statistical test of polarization.  
The first extension of this measure of polarization is the creation of a moving 
window for de of 3, 5, 7 and 10 years before each reform instance. This will 
allow me to have a measure of polarization which will thus vary across 
countries and across time. For the further details on how this panel has been 
constructed in the Paper II Appendix I provide part of the panel for de3 (i.e. 
de with a 3 year window) and a diagrammatic visualization for the whole 
sample and for individual countries of this polarization measure.   
However I have refined the de measure by constructing two further indices, 
ind and pol (also in the Appendix) which will provide a more informed 
picture of the type of polarization we are experiencing at a particular point in 
time in the individual countries. Firstly, the index ind takes into account not 
only the t-stat of rank2  but also that of rank. This provides a better 
understanding of the true curvature of our U and allows me to differentiate 
between four types of polarization: PP-Positive polarization (classic U-
shaped job polarization), NP-Negative polarization (when we have an 
inverted U), UP-Upgrading (when the occupational growth is tilted toward 
higher income occupations) and finally DG-Downgrading (which accounts 
for the increase in left-tail of the distribution). 
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The last measure of polarization pol is a further refinement of the original 
measure and builds on ind to isolates through the significance of the 
coefficients only the cases of proper job polarization.  
LABREF database 
The LABREF database is managed by the European Commission in 
cooperation with the Employment Committee (EMCO). The aim of the 
project, started in December 2005, is to support the work carried out in the 
framework of the Europe 2020 Strategy and to improve the understanding of 
labour market institutions as part of the general economic policy surveillance 
of Member States. 
The measures reported in LABREF refer to enacted legislation, as well as 
other public acts of general scope, including measures entailing changes in 
the implementation framework of a previously adopted measure. In 
addition, they also encompass relevant collective agreements and tripartite 
agreements. The database does not record information on planned reforms or 
draft bills. 
The LABREF database is organised around nine broad policy areas: 
• labour taxation, 
• unemployment benefits, 
• other welfare-related benefits, 
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• active labour market policies, 
• job protection legislation, 
• disability and early retirement schemes, 
• wage bargaining, 
• working time organisation, 
• immigration and mobility. 
The database allows for cross-country analysis on the pace and type of 
measures enacted in a particular year, as well as for tracking measures over 
time, thus providing a consistent and policy-relevant picture of different 
reform strategies being pursued by Member States and of the existing 
interactions between various labour market institutions. LABREF covers the 
28 EU Member States (we will use only 15) and the years 2000-2013 (we are 
going to use the data up to 2011).  
Figure 15: Average number of labour market measures by policy domain, 
EU28 
 
Source: Turrini (2015) 
 
 
 
121 
 
 
Figure 16: Average number of reforms adopted by EU countries, by year and 
country group 
 
 
Source: Turrini (2015) 
 
Figure 17: Direction of reforms by domain and year (average number of 
reforms adopted across the EU) 
 
 
Source: Turrini (2015) 
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5. Empirical Model and Estimation Method  
The empirical strategy consists in mapping the lagged indices of polarization 
calculated on an annual basis from the EU-LFS to the instances of reform 
reported by the LABREF. 
The lagged measures represent the value of the indicators from the EU LFS 
dataset 10, 7, 5 and 3 years before the reform under consideration takes place. 
The mapping will therefore associate the particular type of reform (details 
below) with the extent of polarization. As can be inferred, this will vary from 
country to country due to the high heterogeneity in the sample considered, 
however this exercise will be guided by the framework below.  
Table 3: Application to the Labour Market Institutions of the Social Europe(s) 
framework proposed by Esping Andersen(1990) as in Boeri(2011) 
 
Source: Boeri(2011) 
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This is an attempt to characterize the huge heterogeneity in the European 
landscape. It uses Esping-Andersen (1999) taxonomy and applies it in 
particular to labour market institutions. The first cluster to be considered is 
the Anglo-Saxon one which features weak unions and decentralised 
bargaining. This is followed by the Scandinavian one with active policy 
instruments and reliance on unemployment benefits. This is diametrically 
opposed to the Mediterranean cluster where we have countries with strict 
employment protection and relatively low unemployment benefits. The 
Continental European model instead relies on high levels of both EPL and 
UB.  
Back to the empirical strategy, after matching manually the occupations in 
EU LFS (isco3d) to the ILO wages I built several types of polarization indices 
with 10,7,5,3 year-lag for each country (details in the Appendix). This step 
was followed by the creation of a country-year reform dataset using 
LABREF, counting the instances of reform and their direction.  
The econometric framework I adopt is the following: 
Reformsit = β0 + β1*GDP_growthit + γ*GDP_capitait + δ*Debtit + φ*Unemp_rateit + π 
*Inflationit + η*Tradeit +λt + μi + εit 
where Reformsit represents the total number of reforms passed at time t in 
country i (in some of the specifications the dependant variable will be the 
direction of the policy measure, i.e. increasing/decreasing);  β0 represents the 
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constant in the model; GDP_growthit is the growth rate of GDP; GDP_capitait is 
the natural logarithm of the GDP per capita; Debtit represents general 
government net debt as a share of national GDP; Unemp_rateit is the total 
unemployment rate; Inflationit are the consumer prices calculated as growth 
on the same period of the previous year; Tradeit is the sum of exports and 
imports of goods and services as share of GDP; λt and μi are respectively time 
and country dummies whereas εit is the error term.  
The estimation method applied is to understand whether (lagged) 
polarizaton affects the probability of reforms is xtpoisson which fits 
conditional fixed-effects to Poisson models. This model will be used with the 
number of reforms (# of reforms) adding also year fixed effects, whereas 
country fixed effects are already taken into account by the command fe. 
When instead we use the other dependant variable of interest, direction of 
policy measure, increasing net of decreasing or increase_ (ratio of increasing 
net of decreasing over the total number of reforms), because of the 
underlying sample and the presence of negative values we will have to adopt 
xtreg, in which case we will also add country and year fixed effects (i.coid 
and i.year). 
Details on xtpoisson (the case below is for re source: Stata(c)): 
By default or when re is specified, xtpoisson fits via maximum likelihood the 
random effects model 
Pr(Yit = yit|xit) = F(yit, xitβ+νi) 
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for i= 1,…,n panels, where t= 1,…,ni, and F(x, z) = Pr(X = x), where X is 
Poisson distributed with mean exp(z). In the standard random-effects model, 
νi is assumed to be i.i.d. such that exp(νi) is gamma with mean one and 
variance α, which is estimated from the data. If normal is specified, νi, is 
assumed to be i.i.d. N(0,σ2ν) 
Potential endogeneity issue 
A potential source of endogeneity may be highlighted between the first and 
second paper of this thesis with job polarisation arising from the variation in 
the initial level of institutions.  However, the main point is that whereas in 
my first work I show that institutions affect polarisation, in this subsequent 
analysis I examine how polarisation affects the likelihood of reforms. 
Reforms change institutions, but not always in the same direction and in this 
paper I look at changes in institutions (reforms) rather than levels of 
institutions, which creates less concerns for endogeneity. In a further 
robustness check I also run a model where the initial level of institutions is 
included as an additional control variable, to show that the effect of 
polarisation on reforms is independent from the direct effect that institutions 
may have on (polarisation and) reforms. 
 
5. Results 
In Table A I have reported the baseline specification which allows me to 
understand which are the main drivers of affecting the likelihood of labour 
market reform. The results show that the effect of the growth rate of GDP is 
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negative and statistically significant, meaning that countries reform less 
when undergoing periods of higher GDP growth. The same applies for per 
capita GDP for which higher levels decrease the likelihood of reform. The 
other significant effect, positive although limited in magnitude is net 
government debt which suggests countries are more likely to turn to labour 
market reforms when they have limited fiscal space. The unemployment rate 
is marginally non-significant and has the expected sign, whereas inflation 
and trade openness do not result statistically significant 
 
 
 
 
Table A - Baseline 
    (1) 
 
 
# of 
reforms 
    
 gdp growth -0.0404** 
 
 
(0.0183) 
 log of per capita gdp -7.73e-05** 
 
 
(3.25e-05) 
 government net debt 0.00590* 
 
 
(0.00320) 
 unemployment rate 0.0172 
 
 
(0.0181) 
 inflation 0.00911 
 
 
(0.0334) 
 trade openess 0.00471 
 
 
(0.00572) 
 Observations 167 
 Year & Country Dummies YES 
 Standard errors in 
parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table B1 and B2 add our driver of interest to the model specification, the 
polarization index, de and pol respectively, for different windows. For de 
one can observe that the significant lags are the 5y and 7y ones. Whereas for 
pol we have that the 5y window is the most relevant. This means that the 
number of reforms is likely to be affected by the polarization pattern 
observed in the 5 years before, which underscores the persistence of such 
structural employment changes. In other words an increased hollowing out 
of the labour market produces an increase in the number of reforms with a 5y 
window.  
 
 
 
 
Table B1 - de (dependent variable: # of reforms) 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
3y 5y 7y 10y 
          
gdp growth -0.0410** -0.0472** -0.0499*** -0.0447* 
 
(0.0186) (0.0190) (0.0193) (0.0233) 
log of per capita gdp -7.73e-05** -7.54e-05** -8.93e-05** -7.06e-05 
 
(3.29e-05) (3.42e-05) (3.62e-05) (5.15e-05) 
government net debt 0.00664** 0.00662** 0.00702** -0.000407 
 
(0.00323) (0.00329) (0.00332) (0.00424) 
unemployment rate 0.0114 0.00573 -0.00249 0.0101 
 
(0.0186) (0.0192) (0.0204) (0.0226) 
inflation 0.0198 0.0192 0.0221 0.0102 
 
(0.0341) (0.0347) (0.0348) (0.0429) 
trade openess 0.00760 0.00823 0.0101* 0.0113* 
 
(0.00588) (0.00590) (0.00600) (0.00685) 
polarization index (de) 0.0304 0.0706** 0.0736** 0.0305 
 
(0.0326) (0.0332) (0.0369) (0.0515) 
 
Observations 162 156 148 116 
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Year & Country Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors in 
parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
     
Table B2 - pol (dependent variable: # of reforms) 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
3y 5y 7y 10y 
          
gdp growth -0.0356* -0.0435** -0.0506*** -0.0436* 
 
(0.0187) (0.0189) (0.0194) (0.0243) 
log of per capita gdp -8.00e-05** -7.64e-05** -8.60e-05** -9.06e-05* 
 
(3.28e-05) (3.44e-05) (3.63e-05) (5.36e-05) 
government net debt 0.00628* 0.00611* 0.00722** 9.13e-05 
 
(0.00323) (0.00329) (0.00330) (0.00433) 
unemployment rate 0.0131 0.00709 -0.00216 0.0112 
 
(0.0184) (0.0192) (0.0205) (0.0236) 
inflation 0.0170 0.0145 0.0167 0.0198 
 
(0.0336) (0.0343) (0.0348) (0.0452) 
trade openess 0.00594 0.00563 0.00870 0.0125* 
 
(0.00592) (0.00597) (0.00603) (0.00695) 
polarization index (pol) 0.0515 0.208** 0.0706 -0.0652 
 
(0.0417) (0.0895) (0.0435) (0.108) 
    
Observations 162 156 148 107 
Year & Country Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors in parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
     
Trying to quantify the effect of polarization on the number of labour market 
reforms we can see from Table B1 that a one standard deviation increase in 
polarization de 5y window leads to a 7,06% increase in the likelihood of 
having more reforms, a magnitude which is comparable to the one of GDP 
growth (-4,72%) which has an opposite sign. This positive and significant 
result is confirmed by looking at our alternative measure of polarization, pol 
where with a 5y window in Table B2, we notice that a standard deviation 
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increase in polarization actually results in an even larger increase in the 
likelihood of reform. 
In Table B3 we keep the polarization index de and add a one year lag to all 
our covariates, including the polarization variable. The significance of the 
GDP growth rate and government net coefficients increases whereas GDP 
per capita becomes insignificant. The same happens to our polarization 
variable, but differently from before the two relevant lags now are 3 and 5 
years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B3 - lagged_de 
      (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lagged (L1) variables L1_3y L1_5y L1_7y L1_10y 
      
  L1.gdp growth -0.0543*** -0.0612*** -0.0613*** -0.0540** 
 
(0.0206) (0.0211) (0.0214) (0.0247) 
L1.log of per capita gdp -9.83e-06 -8.46e-06 3.30e-06 -3.54e-05 
 
(3.64e-05) (3.86e-05) (4.20e-05) (5.93e-05) 
L1.government net debt 0.0213*** 0.0205*** 0.0234*** 0.0144** 
 
(0.00473) (0.00487) (0.00515) (0.00650) 
L1.unemployment rate 0.0220 0.0237 0.0123 0.0162 
 
(0.0211) (0.0215) (0.0228) (0.0250) 
L1.inflation 0.0373 0.0181 0.00857 -0.00206 
 
(0.0375) (0.0387) (0.0396) (0.0465) 
L1.trade openess -0.00774 -0.00796 -0.00710 -0.0102 
 
(0.00626) (0.00632) (0.00644) (0.00754) 
L1.polarization index (de) 0.0937*** 0.0675* 0.00392 0.0498 
 
(0.0361) (0.0375) (0.0445) (0.0622) 
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Observations 147 141 133 102 
Year & Country Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors in 
parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
     
 
 
 
 
 
In Table C1 and C2 we are instead interested in the direction of policy 
measure (an increasing in this variable reflects an increase in the generosity 
of a policy measure, a decrease is associated with more deregulation). The 
results go in the expected direction. Polarization de with a 3 year lag is 
associated with less generosity or more deregulation in the policy measure 
observed. The same applies to ind.  
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Table C2 – Direction of 
policy measure 
 increasingnetofdecreasing 3y 
    
gdp growth 0.598*** 
 
(0.219) 
log of per capita gdp 9.45e-05 
 
(0.000343) 
government net debt 0.0412 
 
(0.0384) 
unemployment rate -0.173 
 
(0.223) 
inflation -0.714* 
 
(0.394) 
trade openess -0.0510 
 
(0.0653) 
Positive Polarization (ind) -1.721** 
 
(0.816) 
Upgrading (ind) -3.147** 
 
(1.559) 
Constant 0.839 
 
(14.38) 
  
Observations 162 
Year & Country 
Dummies YES 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table C1 – Direction of 
policy measure 
 increase_ 3y 
    
gdp growth 0.0589** 
 
(0.0257) 
log of per capita gdp 1.91e-05 
 
(4.06e-05) 
government net debt 0.00285 
 
(0.00454) 
unemployment rate -0.0164 
 
(0.0267) 
inflation -0.0543 
 
(0.0461) 
trade openess -0.0147* 
 
(0.00766) 
polarization index (de3) -0.0731* 
 
(0.0432) 
Constant 0.575 
 
(1.684) 
  
Observations 162 
Year & Country 
Dummies YES 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D1 and D2 are meant to replicate what has been shown above, but for 
different types of polarization using the index “ind”. 
Table D1 - Types of polarization (ind 
variable) 
     (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
3y 5y 7y 10y 
          
gdp growth -0.0321* -0.0392** -0.0468** -0.0383 
 
(0.0189) (0.0197) (0.0193) (0.0241) 
log of per capita gdp 
-7.66e-
05** -8.38e-05** -9.12e-05** -0.000101* 
 
(3.33e-05) (3.46e-05) (3.74e-05) (5.39e-05) 
government net debt 0.00671** 0.00612* 0.00792** 0.000818 
 
(0.00328) (0.00333) (0.00340) (0.00438) 
unemployment rate 0.0174 0.0112 0.00345 0.00976 
 
(0.0186) (0.0194) (0.0201) (0.0236) 
inflation 0.00105 0.00988 0.0311 0.0275 
 
(0.0345) (0.0351) (0.0364) (0.0446) 
trade openess 0.00653 0.00739 0.0111* 0.0121* 
 
(0.00598) (0.00599) (0.00611) (0.00717) 
Negative Polarization 
 
0.389 -0.0199 0.247* 
  
(0.401) (0.509) (0.142) 
Positive Polarization -0.0473 0.373 0.123 0.176 
 
(0.0743) (0.395) (0.512) (0.198) 
Upgrading -0.569*** 0.291 0.0148 
 
 
(0.171) (0.404) (0.518) 
 Observations 162 156 148 107 
Year & Country Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors in 
parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
     
In Table D1 Upgrading has a negative and significant effect in the 3y_lag on 
the number of reforms. When we look at the direction of the policy measure 
instead, both the proper polarization and upgrading have a negative effect 
on the value of the value of our dependent variable in the 3 year lag. It is 
slightly different for the standardised version, as can be seen from the table 
on the right below.  
Table D2 - Types of polarization (ind variable) + 
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Direction of policy measure 
       (1) 
 
  (1) (2) 
increasingnetofdecreasing 3y 
 
increase_ 3y 5y 
    
 
      
gdp growth 0.598*** 
 
gdp growth 0.0621** 0.0740*** 
 
(0.219) 
  
(0.0261) (0.0263) 
log of per capita gdp 9.45e-05 
 
log of per capita gdp 1.51e-05 1.08e-06 
 
(0.000343) 
  
(4.08e-
05) 
(4.17e-
05) 
government net debt 0.0412 
 
government net debt 0.00181 0.000532 
 
(0.0384) 
  
(0.00457) (0.00454) 
unemployment rate -0.173 
 
unemployment rate -0.0178 -0.00658 
 
(0.223) 
  
(0.0265) (0.0275) 
inflation -0.714* 
 
inflation -0.0585 -0.0408 
 
(0.394) 
  
(0.0469) (0.0467) 
trade openess -0.0510 
 
trade openess -0.0160** -0.0142* 
 
(0.0653) 
  
(0.00777) (0.00774) 
Positive Polarization -1.721** 
 
Negative Polarization 
 
1.024*** 
 
(0.816) 
   
(0.370) 
Upgrading  -3.147** 
 
Positive Polarization -0.172* 0.847** 
 
(1.559) 
  
(0.0971) (0.366) 
Constant 0.839 
 
Upgrading -0.0381 1.195*** 
 
(14.38) 
  
(0.185) (0.384) 
   
Constant 0.955 0.281 
Observations 162 
  
(1.711) (1.740) 
Year & Country Dummies YES 
 
Observations 162 156 
Standard errors in parentheses 
  
Year & Country 
Dummies YES YES 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
Standard errors in 
parentheses 
  
   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
   
I have also run a number of robustness checks. Instead of using poisson for 
my specifications I have resorted to negative binomial regressions. The 
results are broadly consistent with has been presented above. Moreover I run 
the regressions above with and without including polarization to see 
whether the coefficient of other variables change and also the opposite, 
keeping only polarization and including other variables progressively as 
controls. Again the results are not altered. Placebo tests with forward lags of 
134 
 
3, 5, 7 and 10 years for the three alternative measures of polarization were 
also run and they all lead to an effect equal to zero thus making the results 
above more robust.  
Finally it is interesting to investigate how polarization interacts with more 
traditional taxonomies of welfare capitalism, therefore analysing the effect of 
job polarization on labour market reforms in terms of the Variaties of 
Capitalism (VoC) classification and Esping-Andersen’s three worlds of 
welfare capitalism.   
Varieties of Capitalism and Job Polarization 
When we apply the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) classification we can see a 
number of very interesting results. The polarization index has a negative and 
significant magnitude, in other words increased polarization is indeed 
associated with less propensity to reform in LME countries. On the other 
hand for CMEs the sign of this variable is positive and significant: higher 
polarization leads to an increased number of reforms. I think this is an 
extremely interesting result because it proves are hypotheses that Liberal 
Market Economics are polarization consistent. These countries, by relying on 
flexibility, they harness market dynamics, thus accommodating changes 
brought by technological change. Whereas Coordinated Market Economies 
which are against big changes, especially in the middle of the occupational 
distribution, are confirmed to be polarization incompatible therefore job 
polarization destabilizes the system leading to an increased need for reforms. 
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Job polarization leads to an erosion of welfare models through the 
weakening of the wage setting institutions which are meant to stabilize the 
system. I don’t look at the direction of reform since as extensively explained 
in the VoC literature it depends on the path dependency of these economies, 
but it is interesting to highlight how job polarization seems also to lead to a 
possible convergence of Command Market Economies towards Liberal 
Market Economies, re-opening the age-old debate between convergence and 
divergence (Kerr, Dunlop, Fredeirck, Myers, 1960; Goldthorpe, 1984; Streeck 
& Thelen, 2005) and the more recent conceptualizations with the “dual 
convergecence” thesis (Hay, 2004; Schekle, 2008).  
 
Table VarCap - pol5 
     (1) (2)   
 
LME CME 
         
gdp growth 0.128 -0.0124 
 
 
(0.0999) (0.0547) 
 log of per capita gdp 0.00102** -0.000184 
 
 
(0.000431) (0.000123) 
 government net debt 0.251** -0.00944 
 
 
(0.114) (0.00939) 
 unemployment rate -0.856** 0.0624 
 
 
(0.428) (0.0793) 
 inflation -0.439** -0.137 
 
 
(0.197) (0.0843) 
 trade openess 0.0645* 0.00563 
 
 
(0.0358) (0.0162) 
 polarization index (pol5) -1.525** 0.415** 
 
 
(0.626) (0.204) 
 Constant -51.62** 8.985* 
 
 
(21.88) (5.305) 
 Observations 23 73   
Standard errors in 
parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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In the Appendix you can also find a Robustness check which uses an 
alternative index of polarization (de5 instead of pol5) and confirms the 
pattern suggested above.  
 
 
Esping-Andersen Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism and Job 
Polarization 
As for the VoC categorization, we now move to test the effect of job 
polarization on labour market reforms according to the Esping-Andersen 
classification in the Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. We choose the pol 
and de index for the 5 year window, which resulted the most robust across 
specifications.  
Table Esping - pol5 
     (1) (2) (3) 
 
Social Dem Continental Liberal 
        
gdp growth 0.0168 -0.148*** 0.128 
 
(0.0745) (0.0301) (0.0999) 
log of per capita gdp -0.000253 -1.74e-05 0.00102** 
 
(0.000165) (4.85e-05) (0.000431) 
government net debt 0.0140 0.0171*** 0.251** 
 
(0.0168) (0.00565) (0.114) 
unemployment rate 0.261** -0.0435* -0.856** 
 
(0.123) (0.0226) (0.428) 
inflation 0.00391 -0.125 -0.439** 
 
(0.144) (0.0763) (0.197) 
trade openess -0.0145 0.0357*** 0.0645* 
 
(0.0271) (0.0125) (0.0358) 
polarization index (pol5) 0.330 0.467*** -1.525** 
 
(0.276) (0.126) (0.626) 
Constant 10.46 -1.425 -51.62** 
 
(8.014) (2.044) (21.88) 
Observations 44 89 23 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
Table Esping - de5 
     (1) (2) (3) 
 
Social Dem Continental Liberal 
        
gdp growth -0.0332 -0.157*** 0.106 
 
(0.0642) (0.0307) (0.0992) 
log of per capita gdp -6.37e-05 -1.48e-05 0.00127*** 
 
(0.000161) (4.80e-05) (0.000486) 
government net debt 0.0339* 0.0187*** 0.305** 
 
(0.0189) (0.00564) (0.136) 
unemployment rate 0.453*** -0.0505** -0.990** 
 
(0.141) (0.0227) (0.478) 
inflation 0.0554 -0.163** -0.646** 
 
(0.143) (0.0764) (0.272) 
trade openess -0.00112 0.0406*** 0.0393 
 
(0.0277) (0.0124) (0.0418) 
polarization index (de5) -0.153 0.159*** -0.955** 
 
(0.116) (0.0447) (0.433) 
Constant 0.179 -1.579 -58.98** 
 
(8.375) (2.030) (23.40) 
Observations 44 89 23 
Standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
What one can observe from the specifications is that the index of polarization 
matters for the Continental and Liberal regimes, whereas they are never 
significant for the countries in the Social Democratic category. In the Liberal 
regime as it had already occurred in the VoC classification, the sign of the 
coefficient is negative, meaning that higher polarization is actually associated 
with a lower likelihood of reform. On the other hand for Continental 
countries the coefficient turns positive which leads to the same 
considerations made above: job polarization destabilizes Continental 
countries which are forced to increase their reform activity. In the case of 
Social Democratic countries our coefficient is not significant, this is probably 
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due to the fact that upgrading is the most relevant employment structure and 
instead of an a hollowing out of the middle we have actually witnessed a 
shift of the entire skill occupational distribution towards higher income 
occupations.  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper I ask whether job polarization has a feedback effect on labour 
market institutions and policies, so that different degrees of polarization lead 
to different articulations of institutions at the domestic level, thus reinforcing 
or altering differences in national models across the European space. The 
political economy channel at the core of the analysis sees a decreased 
bargaining power of trade unions due to the hollowing out of their power 
base (particularly relevant for manufacturing) translated into a weakened 
intermediating effect in the labour market reform process. The decrease in 
concerted power thus reflects into an increased reform activity, a move 
towards deregulation and a decrease in the generosity of the policy measures. 
The hypotheses set out by the paper seem to be confirmed. The erosion of 
privileged interest representation and a weakened power of intermediation 
translate into a heightened intensity of labour market reforms and into a 
higher degree of deregulation and decreased generosity of policy measures. 
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When I look at the welfare capitalism taxonomy I find that LMEs are 
polarization consistent, thus leading to a lower pressure to reform, whereas 
CMEs are polarization incompatible leading to an increased reform activity.  
The analysis finds that the job polarization experienced by a particular 
country in the 5 years before the reform instance is consistently among the 
strongest predictors of reform activity, as significant as other drivers such as 
GDP growth and government net debt. Moreover a higher degree of 
polarization tends to be associated with more deregulation and a decrease in 
the generosity of the policy measure. Finally, as anticipated above the 
empirical framework is tested against more conventional taxonomies of 
welfare capitalism (Esping-Andersen and VoC) revealing how both the 
continental and liberal regimes have been profoundly affected by job 
polarization. 
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PAPER III 
Falling Behind: the Decoupling of Job and 
Wage Polarization in Europe 
 
 
Abstract 
The “Great Decoupling” is the term used to describe the divergence 
between labour productivity and employment/wages that occurred in 
the US in the 1980s and that has become quite pronounced over the 
past thirty years: while productivity was increasing, median family 
income started to trail and job growth in the middle began to decline. 
The hollowing out of the middle in the US labour market produced 
both job and wage polarization patterns which persisted throughout 
the period 1985-2005. However, while wage inequality has been on the 
rise also in Europe, has the U-shaped impact on the wage distribution 
predicted by the literature materialized? The findings in this paper 
show that job polarization increased upper-tail inequality (90/50) and 
decreased lower-tail (50/10) inequality but that employment protection 
legislation restrained these wage effects.  
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1. Introduction  
In October 2013 the UK Department for Business Innovation & Skills was 
writing: 
    
If only demand-side factors such as task-biased technological change are behind 
changes in the labour market, we would expect wages and employment to move 
together, producing similar changes in the job distribution and wage distribution. 
The fact that we do not observe this, with growth in jobs but not in wages at the 
lower end of the labour market, suggests supply-side factors could also be important 
there, with increased supply potentially coming from displaced intermediate workers, 
former benefit recipients pushed into work by eligibility changes, or immigration5 
 
Unlike the evidence for the US, in Europe job polarization does not seem to 
have been followed by a corresponding pattern of wage polarization. In this 
paper I build on my two previous contributions for what concerns the role of 
institutions and job polarization to understand how wage patterns have 
evolved over the last three decades and establish what are the implications 
for wage inequality.  
Boehm (2013) investigates the US wage distribution since the end of the 
1980s and claims that routinisation has not only replaced middle-skill 
workers’ jobs but also strongly decreased their realtive wages: both the 
analysis of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) and the 
Current Population Survey (CPS) highlight that there was a substantial 
decrease since the mid-1980s in the number of well-paid middle-skill jobs in 
                                                        
 
 
 
5 BIS Research Paper Number 134 (October 2013) – Hollowing out and the future of the 
labour market 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/250206/bis-
13-1213-hollowing-out-and-future-of-the-labour-market.pdf 
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manufacturing and clerical occupations and there was a significant drop in 
the relative earnings for workers around the median of the wage distribution 
with no meaningful real wage gains over the last three decades.  
Naticchioni et al. (2014) instead who explore the unconditional and 
conditional wage polarization in Europe using industry and individual level 
data for the period 1995-2007 find scant signs of polarization in Europe. 
Moreover, they provide evidence for technological change to be affecting the 
lower and upper part of the distribution differently because of services tasks 
being crucial for the lower quantiles and abstract tasks in the case of higher 
ones. This I think is the most relevant finding, which I will exploit also in this 
paper. Let’s look at their work in more detail in order to understand how my 
contribution fits within the broader debate on wage polarization. The authors 
providing evidence from a restricted sample (AT, ES, GR, IE, IT, PT, UK) 
which is represented in the figure below showing gross current hourly wage 
and the decomposition of technology into three occupational tasks (abstract, 
routine, service). As one can observe, the abstract component has a steep 
increasing impact along the wage distribution, thus exerting a positive 
impact on the increase of both the 90/50 and the 50/10 inequality ratios.   
 
 
 
143 
 
Figure 18: Gross current hourly wage: detailed composition e_ect. Sample of 
countries for which hourly wages are available 
 
Source: Naticchioni et al. (2014) 
On the other hand the pattern for the service task intensity seems to be 
decreasing along the wage distribution. This means that we should actually 
see an increase in wages in the lower part of the wage distribution, with a 
polarization effect on the lower tail of the distribution that reduces the 50/10 
ratio. However according to the authors these are the patterns that have 
materialized in gross hourly wage in the period 1995-2007 for the selected 
sample:  
Figure 19: Gross current hourly wage: overall change, aggregate composition and wage 
structure Source: Naticchioni et al. (2014) 
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It seems that rather than a wage polarization pattern, the effects of job 
polarization on wages have led to an increase concentrated above all in the 
upper quantiles.  
My work will try to extend the evidence to a larger sample of countries and 
time period and provide an analysis across sectors. Also by exploiting the 
same set of data it will compare the EU patterns to the US ones. Finally, it 
will investigate the differential effects of job polarization on upper and lower 
tail inequality and look at the wage dispersion patterns according to the 
Varieties of Capitalism taxonomy.    
 
2. Literature Review 
In an article for Foreign Policy in 1994 Krugman offers an explanation of why 
modern advanced economies face serious economic trouble which is 
reflected particularly by two factors: jobs and wages. Specifically, while in 
the mid-1900s unemployment didn’t seem to be a problem in the United 
States, (which, at the time, had a near perfect employment record with 
unemployment systematically approaching the ideal 5.5% level), an 
increasing number of American workers received wages that forced them to 
live at what is widely considered to be poverty-level. On the other hand, 
Europe faced a constantly increasing level of unemployment. Paradoxically, 
while both the United States and Europe struggled with labour market 
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issues, the world experienced a time of great technological advancement 
which, according to many, should have been accompanied by higher wages 
and increased rate of employment. Krugman explains this dichotomy 
between theory and reality by hypothesizing that technological 
advancements will lead to a higher increase in wage polarization. As a result, 
in the United States, where workers remain highly not unionized, wage 
distribution has undergone extreme polarization. At the same time, in 
Europe, where workers’ unions and collective bargaining have mitigated the 
phenomenon of income inequality, the same technological advancement has 
resulted in an increase of the overall unemployment rate.  
The economic literature has identified a variety of factors as determinants of 
income inequality. Authors such as Topel (1997) have stressed the influence 
of supply side factors. He identified changes in the supply of skills as a key 
driver of wage inequality, while the evidence relating woman’s increased 
labour force participation and immigration with reductions in the wages of 
low-skilled male workers was deemed inconclusive. Human capital 
investment was identified as a key tool in reversing the trend of rising 
income inequality, even though according to Topel its ability to raise the 
wages of low skilled workers appears far more dubious than its ability to 
limit the emergence of wage inequality among the highly skilled.  
Other authors built on these perspectives and shifted the debate on the 
causes of wage inequality towards a dichotomy: skill-biased technical change 
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(SBTC) and international trade (IT) liberalization. In a 2013 empirical study, 
Afonso et al. tried to assess both perspectives analysing the impact of these 
two factors across 18 EU countries. The trade explanation draws from the 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem, postulating that a fall in the relative price of 
imported goods must reduce the return on the factor that is used intensively 
in their production. Specialization in goods requiring high-skilled workers 
implies higher demand for such skills and therefore higher relative wages. 
The SBTC explanation is rooted in the technological knowledge bias in 
favour of skilled labour; this leads to a relative increase in productivity of 
skilled labour and, in equilibrium, of relative wages. The results of the study 
suggested SBTC as the main explanation for within country wage inequality, 
followed by education expenditure levels. IT proved to be a relevant 
explanation only in countries at the frontier of technological innovation, 
where immigration seemed, interestingly, to have a negative effect on wage 
inequality. Nevertheless, other studies have supported the trade hypothesis. 
In particular, Milanovic & Squire (2005) found evidence that trade tariffs 
reductions lead to increased wage inequality; however, the empirical results 
were admittedly not very strong, with the evidence for between industry 
inequality being more certain than that for within industry inequality. 
Some scholars have taken a different perspective, and looked at the way 
institutions influence income inequality. Rueda and Pontusson (2000) looked 
at how the presence of different varieties of capitalism in different countries 
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affected the emergence of differentiated levels of income inequality. The 
authors argued that in liberal market economies factors such as increases in 
female labour force participation are able to affect wage inequality, while in 
social market economies they do not. Works such as Blau & Khan (1996), by 
analysing the differences between the U.S. and other OECD countries, 
complement these theories by offering an account of how in liberal market 
economies labour market institutions, namely decentralized wage-setting 
mechanisms, are able to explain higher compression at the bottom of the 
wage distribution.  
Also, it is worth noting that some scholars (e.g. Card & DiNardo, 2002) 
characterize rising income inequality in the US over the past 35 years as an 
episodic event, driven by non-market factors: namely a fall in the real value 
of minimum wages. According to this line of thought, this was then 
compounded by a physiological change in labour force composition 
(growing education and experience). Without getting into too much detail, 
we will just note that the proposed arguments are not valid if taken outside 
of the US context, and therefore are unable to explain rising wage inequality 
in other developed economies.  
Acemoglu, Aghion and Violante (2001) present very interesting framework 
looking at deunionization, technical change and inequality for the US and 
UK by splitting the workers in low skill and high skill, not looking at specific 
occupations/tasks. The authors argue that SBTC causes deunionization 
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because it increases the outside option of skilled workers, undermining the 
coalition among skilled and unskilled worker in support of unions. Their 
main conclusion is that although deunionization is not the underlying cause 
of the increase in inequality, it amplifies the direct effect of SBTC since the 
role of wage compressors by unions is removed.  
 
The work by Antonczyk, DeLeire, Fitzenberger (2010) compares the US and 
German wage inequality patterns and looks at the role of SBTC in 
determining the increase in wage inequality in Germany. There is an increase 
in wage inequalities in both countries but the patterns between US and 
Germany are differentiated along age cohorts and low/high skilled workers. 
The  authors argue that SBTC is not sufficient to explain the wage patterns in 
Germany, and that German institutions might play a major role. 
Applying a quantile decomposition analysis, Naticchioni, Ricci, and Rustichelli 
(2008) investigate empirically the relation between wage inequality, employment 
structure, and skill biased change in Italy. Their main finding is that changes in 
wage inequality are mainly driven by a decrease in educational premia over time, 
whereas the employment structure plays only a minor role. Skill-biased change is 
thus replaced by increasing educational attainment as an explanation for changes in 
wage inequality.  
For Acemoglu and Autor (2011) the so-called canonical model has been 
extensively used to explain skill biased demand shifts and wage inequality, 
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nevertheless said model does not take into consideration a number of more 
recent factors which may help shed light on increasing inequalities in wage 
distribution in the United States and other advanced economies. According 
to authors, a new, more accurate model for the analysis of wage inequality 
should take into account the decline in wages of low-skill workers, job 
polarization, technological advancements which allow for the substitution, in 
certain tasks, of labour, offshoring – i.e. the substitution of domestic labour 
with foreign workers, and changes in wages which are not evenly distributed 
across the earnings scale – i.e. higher changes in wages in lower or higher 
earning jobs. 
According to Lemieux (2008) since the 1980s wage inequality in the United 
States began rapidly increasing and by the 1990s the general consensus 
attributed such sharp growth in inequality to an increase in the demand for 
skilled labour. While the general trend of wage distribution remained the 
same throughout the 1990s, Lamieux argues that a closer analysis will reveal 
a fundamental difference between the wage inequality which characterized 
the 1980s and that which occurred in the last 15 years. In fact, the author 
notes that the recent increment in wage inequality has affected the higher 
end of the wage distribution scale in a more significant manner. In other 
words, higher wages have suffered a more dramatic increase in inequality. 
When looking at the underlying reasons which may explain such trend, 
Lamieux identifies three key factors: changes in demand for specific tasks 
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carried out by high-earning workers, de-unionization, and a more wide-
spread use of the ‘pay-for-performance’ model. 
3. Theory and Hypotheses  
Lemieux (2008, p 23) argues that if advanced economies are subject to the 
same technological change and technological change is the main explanation 
for growing wage inequality it is difficult to fully explain such divergent 
inequality patterns across countries. Freeman and Katz (1995) try to address 
this puzzle by suggesting that supply and demand, as evidenced by Skilled 
Biased Technical Change (SBTC), can contribute only in part to changes in 
inequality and that wage-setting institutions need to be taken into account. 
The authors put forward a more encompassing model of Supply, Demand, 
Institutions (SDI) in which common demand shocks are mitigated by 
institutional factors.  
The hypotheses in this paper therefore will build on the theoretical 
framework by Lemieux(2008) and will try to argue that where wage-setting 
institutions are weak, a negative technological change depresses the wage 
growth in the sector where automation is stronger, instead where they are 
strong, wages in the medium sector remain stable despite the same negative 
demand change. To make the hypotheses testable they will thus be 
formulated in terms of upper-tail (90/50) inequality and lower-tail inequality 
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(50/10) and will build on the results from the two previous papers, as 
follows: 
- Hypothesis H1:  EPL reduces upper-tail inequality (90/50) while 
maintaining or increasing lower-tail (50/10) inequality 
- Hypothesis H2: Job polarization increases upper-tail inequality (90/50) 
while reducing lower-tail (50/10) inequality 
4. Operationalisation and Data 
The main aim of this paper remains to investigate the effects on wage 
inequality of both secular trends of technological change, as evidenced by job 
polarization, as well as institution-based explanations. For this reason I will 
perform a series of empirical analyses.  
Firstly, I will start by looking at wage dynamics and evolutions across sectors 
for the EU and US in the last three decades in order to find evidence of wage 
polarization. Secondly, my analysis will include fixed effects regressions of 
wage inequality ratios (upper 90/50 and lower tail 50/10) on wage 
determinants common in the literature and separately on an institutional 
factor (employment protection legislation) and on job polarization. Finally, I 
will try to unveil wage dynamics over time according to the Varieties of 
Capitalism taxonomy.  
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The main source of data on which I rely is the Occupational Wages around 
the World (OWW) Database6 compiled by Richard B. Freeman and Remco H. 
Oostendorp. This database contains wage data covering 171 countries from 
1983 to 2008 derived from the ILO October Inquiry database. The 2013 
version expands the earlier databases by including not only the most recent 
ILO data but also data for earlier years which were previously available only 
in hardcopy format. Another novelty is that wages are standardized on both 
an hourly and monthly basis unlike the two previous standardizations which 
were on a monthly basis only.  
The normalized wages I am going to use are hw3w1us (hourly wages in US$ 
with uniform calibration) and mw3w1us (monthly wage in US$ with uniform 
calibration), both measures are considered by the authors the most reliable 
and consistent following the standardization procedure involving a 
lexicographic ordering and assignment of hours of work in the period 1983-
2008 and an estimation of data type correction factors. I am also using only 
data for the same 16 EU countries of my first investigation plus the USA.  
The other key variable from this dataset is y3: industry code, to which I apply 
a modified version of the Eurostat industry aggregation7 based on NACE 
                                                        
 
 
 
6 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTNWDR2013/Resources/8258024-
1320950747192/8260293-1320956712276/8261091-
1348683883703/WDR2013_bp_Occupational_Wages.pdf  
7 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/Annexes/htec_esms_an3.pdf  
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Rev. 2 at 2-digit level for compiling three main aggregates for my analysis 
(details can be found in the Appendix): 
- Sector 1: Less Knowledge-intensive services (LKIS) 
- Sector 2: Manufacturing industries 
- Sector 3: Knowledge-intensive services (KIS) 
This aggregation is consistent throughout my time period and is meant to 
match the task-based framework in Autor and Dorn (2009, 2013) for 
analysing the allocation of skills to tasks and for studying the effect of new 
technologies on the labour market and their impact on the distribution of 
earnings. 
 
Table 4: Sectoral Classification 
 
 
Less Knowledge-intensive 
services (LKIS) 
Wholesale trade (grocery) 
Retail trade (grocery) 
Restaurants and hotels 
Railway transport 
Passenger transport by road 
Freight transport by road 
Sanitary services 
Repair of motor vehicles 
 
 
 
 
 
Coalmining 
Crude petroleum and natural gas 
production 
Other mining and quarrying 
Slaughtering, preparing and preserving 
meat 
Manufacture of dairy products 
Grain mill products 
Manufacture of bakery products 
Spinning, weaving and finishing textiles 
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Manufacturing industries 
 
Manufacture of wearing apparel (except 
footwear) 
Manufacture of leather and leather 
products (except footwear) 
Manufacture of footwear 
Sawmills, planing and other wood mills 
Manufacture of wooden furniture and 
fixtures 
Manufacture of pulp, paper and 
paperboard 
Printing, publishing and allied industries 
Manufacture of industrial chemicals 
Manufacture of other chemical products 
Petroleum refineries 
Iron and steel basic industries 
Manufacture of metal products (except 
machinery and equipment) 
Manufacture of machinery (except 
electrical) 
Manufacture of electronic equipment, 
machinery and supplies 
Construction 
Shipbuilding and repairing 
Electric light and power 
 
 
Knowledge-intensive services 
(KIS) 
 
Communication 
Banks 
Insurance 
Air transport 
Supporting services to air transport 
Maritime transport 
Supporting services to maritime transport 
Engineering and architectural services 
Public administration 
Education services 
Medical and dental services 
 
5. Empirical Analysis and Results 
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In the first part of the empirical analysis I will start by looking at wage 
dynamics and evolutions across sectors for the EU (16 countries) and the US 
in the last three decades in order to find evidence for wage polarization.  
Table 5 : Wage dynamics across sectors US vs EU  
Table:  US 
   
 
Panel A: log hourly wages by sector 
Sector1 
    
 
mean p10 p50 p90 
1983 1.940974 1.133105 1.988746 2.404947 
2006 2.772428 2.204499 2.777644 3.30541 
% Difference 43% 95% 40% 37% 
     Sector2 
    
 
mean p10 p50 p90 
1983 2.382332 2.076709 2.478533 2.591755 
2006 2.797983 2.446418 2.802103 3.223965 
% Difference 17% 18% 13% 24% 
          Sector3 
    
 
mean p10 p50 p90 
1983 2.176659 1.873793 1.932674 2.723509 
2006 3.159329 2.488452 3.239369 3.679549 
% Difference 45% 33% 68% 35% 
 
EU 
   
 
Panel B: log hourly wages by sector 
Sector1 
    
 
mean p10 p50 p90 
1983 1.456265 1.02807 1.509077 1.894727 
2006 2.80048 2.389251 2.765274 3.293916 
% Difference 92% 132% 83% 74% 
     Sector2 
    
 
mean p10 p50 p90 
1983 1.454285 1.001318 1.492709 1.8782 
2006 2.887259 2.334956 2.843965 3.477803 
% Difference 99% 133% 91% 85% 
     
     Sector3 
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mean p10 p50 p90 
1983 1.860466 1.37343 1.836663 2.520783 
2006      3.1870       2.6564       3.1284       3.7521  
% Difference 71% 93% 70% 49% 
 
EU 
   
 
Panel D: log monthly wages by sector 
Sector1 
    
 
mean p10 p50 p90 
1983 6.599574 6.175875 6.630117 6.630117 
2006 7.910147 7.493174 7.857867 8.405339 
% Difference 20% 21% 19% 27% 
     Sector2 
    
 
mean p10 p50 p90 
1983 6.588804 6.132565 6.620379 7.014369 
2006 7.992548 7.490172 7.945318 7.490172 
% Difference 21% 22% 20% 7% 
     
     Sector3 
    
 
mean p10 p50 p90 
1983 7.00754 6.529374 6.985634 7.657275 
2006 8.263417 7.703236 8.232835 8.890612 
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% Difference 18% 18% 18% 16% 
 
US 
   
 
Panel C: log monthly wages by sector 
Sector1 
    
 
mean p10 p50 p90 
1983 7.042696 6.239644 7.081564 7.511938 
2006 7.882998 8.269511 7.888076 8.41584 
% Difference 12% 33% 11% 12% 
     Sector2 
    
 
mean p10 p50 p90 
1983 7.497581 7.1837 7.610299 7.698746 
2006 7.908526 7.55685 7.912534 8.334396 
% Difference 5% 5% 4% 8% 
          Sector3 
    
 
mean p10 p50 p90 
1983 7.285032 6.982167 7.041047 7.831882 
2006 8.269511 7.598884 8.349108 8.790671 
% Difference 14% 9% 19% 12% 
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A number of interesting patterns emerge from this preliminary evidence. As 
can be clearly seen from Panel A in the table above of log hourly wages the 
US in the period between 1983 and 2006 shows a clear U-shaped pattern in 
the wage growth of its sectors: with low-skilled services and high-skilled 
services growing considerably more than the middle sector. On the other 
hand in the EU the distinctive pattern of wage polarization that we observe 
in the US does not seem to materialize. The same result is obtained in Panel 
C by comparing the growth in log monthly wages below, again the US shows 
wage polarization while this is not the case for the European countries. 
 
In the second part of the empirical analysis, I run a fixed effects model to 
understand what are the wage inequality determinants. The econometric 
framework I adopt will thus be the following: 
log(lowineq50_10)it = β0 + β1*productivityit + γ*female_lfp it + π*inflationit  + 
δ*migrationit + φ*unemp_rateit +χ*EPL+ [η*job_polarizationit] +λt + μi + εit 
log(lowineq90_50)it = β0 + β1*productivityit + γ*female_lfp it + π*inflationit  + 
δ*migrationit + φ*unemp_rateit + χ*EPL+ [η*job_polarizationit] +λt + μi + εit 
 
Note: I have included the job_polarization variable in squared brackets since it will be run 
separately from the specification containing EPL. This is because as shown in one of my 
previous paper EPL is among the determinants of job polarization in the sense that it 
mediates the effect of routinization. Having them together we would be looking at the effect 
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of job polarization net of EPL which would not be consistent since I show that EPL is a 
determinant of job polarization.  
In the specification above log(lowineq50_10)it and log(lowineq90_50)it represent 
respectively the log of the ratio between p90 and p50 and p50 over p10 at 
time t in country i; β0 represents the constant in the model; productivityit is the 
productivity rate defined as GDP per person employed;  female_lfp is the 
female labour force participation; inflationit are the consumer prices calculated 
as growth on the same period of the previous year: migrationit represents the 
total inflow of foreign population in a country i at time t; unemp_rateit is the 
total unemployment rate; EPL is the strictness of employment legislation in a 
country i at time t, whereas job_polarizationit for the final specifications is 
proxied by the index de5 constructed in the previous paper and which 
represents a job polarization index for a moving window of the past 5 years; 
λt and μi are respectively time and country dummies whereas εit is the error 
term.  
As highlighted in the previous paper a potential source of endogeneity may 
arise from job polarisation being affected by the initial level of institutions. 
Fors this reason in this paper I adopted different specifications which try to 
look at the effects on inequality separately. 
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Table 6: Effect of EPL on upper-tail inequality (90/50) and lower-tail 
inequality (50/10) 
     (1) (2) 
 
lower_inequality (50/10) upper_inequality (90/50) 
      
inflation -0.00223*** 0.0149*** 
 
(0.000356) (0.000578) 
migration 4.42e-09*** 5.01e-08*** 
 
(9.58e-10) (1.56e-09) 
productivity -2.25e-06*** -2.49e-06*** 
 
(3.38e-08) (5.49e-08) 
female_lfp -0.00183*** -0.00299*** 
 
(2.90e-05) (4.71e-05) 
unr -0.00503*** -0.00234*** 
 
(9.26e-05) (0.000151) 
EPL 0.00980*** -0.0127*** 
 
(0.000440) (0.000716) 
Constant 1.435*** 1.576*** 
 
(0.00412) (0.00670) 
   Observations 9,145 9,145 
R-squared 0.532 0.571 
Number of years 16 16 
R2_adj 0.531 0.570 
Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
Looking first at lower-tail inequality (50/10) we observe that a standard 
deviation increase in inflation and female labour force participation both 
reduce inequality by a similar magnitude, the effect of the unemployment 
rate is also negative, however of a larger size. The coefficient for migration 
has a positive sign, but its effect is almost negligible, the same can be said 
about productivity which should reduce lower-tail inequality, but the 
magnitude is extremely small. Finally analysing our coefficient of interest in 
this specification we have that employment protection legislation increases 
lower tail inequality.  
161 
 
Looking at upper-tail inequality (90/50) the effect of inflation has now an 
opposite sign and a larger magnitude. Female labour force participation 
which still has a negative sign has also increased in size. Migration seems to 
increase upper-tail inequality, but its effect is still negligible. The 
contribution of productivity remains negative and still negligible. 
Unemployment reduces the 90/50 ratio as well as employment protection 
legislation which now has an opposite and larger effect than in column (1). 
The contributions of EPL thus goes in the expected direction but I will 
discuss this result in more detail below.  
Table 7: Effect of job polarization (de5) on upper-tail inequality (90/50) and 
lower-tail inequality (50/10) 
     (1) (2) 
 
lower_inequality (50/10) upper_inequality (90/50) 
      
inflation 0.0117*** 0.0325*** 
 
(0.000621) (0.000503) 
migration 4.07e-09 -6.56e-08*** 
 
(3.22e-09) (2.60e-09) 
productivity -1.82e-06*** -1.24e-05*** 
 
(1.33e-07) (1.08e-07) 
female_lfp -0.000786*** -0.00579*** 
 
(6.77e-05) (5.49e-05) 
unr -0.00353*** 0.00408*** 
 
(0.000165) (0.000133) 
polarization (de5) -0.00716*** 0.0105*** 
 
(0.000330) (0.000268) 
Constant 1.326*** 2.486*** 
 
(0.0143) (0.0116) 
   Observations 3,715 3,715 
R-squared 0.534 0.922 
Number of years 9 9 
R2_adj 0.532 0.922 
Standard errors in 
parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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In the specification where I replace EPL with job polarization using the index 
de5 from the previous paper a very interesting pattern of results emerges.  
Polarization in column (1) has a negative and significant magnitude, an 
increase of one standard deviation in our measure of polarization thus 
reduces lower-tail inequality (50/10). On the other hand, the effect of job 
polarization on upper-tail inequality (90/50) is opposite and of a slightly 
larger magnitude. Job polarization thus contributes to more inequality in the 
upper tail. It is important to highlight that the number of observations drops 
compared to before since this specification was run over a period of 9 years 
(2000-2008) rather than 16 years (1993-2008) as in the previous one. However, 
looking at the R2 we note that in this specification it almost doubles between 
column (1) and (2), meaning that job polarization seems to explain much 
more the increase in upper-tail inequality than lower-tail inequality.  
A number of robustness checks have been carried out. To understand 
whether there is a trend in inequality firstly I applied a forward lag to my 
measure of polarization the resulting effect being negligible. Secondly, I 
included linear and quadratic time trends and what I obtain is broadly 
similar to the specifications above.   
Before discussing the results just obtained, let’s summarise them with a 
diagrammatic visualization: 
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Table 8: Effect of EPL and Job Polarization on Lower and Upper-tail 
inequality 
 
 
Contribution from  
 
Lower-tail inequality 
(50/10) 
 
Upper-tail inequality 
(90/50) 
EPL Positive Negative 
Job polarization (de5) Negative Positive 
 
The first hypothesis H1 laid out beforehand seems to be confirmed, EPL 
reduces upper-tail inequality (90/50) while maintaining or increasing lower-
tail (50/10) inequality. EPL does reduce upper-tail inequality, this may be due 
to the fact that the higher strictness is associated with an increased difficulty 
for employers to fire workers in the middle of the employment distribution 
which reflects in their wage level being preserved. On the other hand lower-
tail inequality is increased, although the effect is smaller in magnitude than 
for the upper-tail inequality. EPL thus contributes to maintaining the ratio 
p50/p10 since wages of the middle workers are preserved by the strictness in 
firing and by diminishing the propensity to create temporary jobs at the 
lower end of the distribution which would likely translate into a decrease in 
p50.   
The second hypothesis H2 of job polarization increasing upper-tail inequality 
(90/50) while reducing lower-tail (50/10) inequality is also proven to be 
correct. Job polarization is associated with a hollowing out of the middle and 
increases in employment growth at the low and high end of the distribution, 
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as expected this translates into a corresponding effect in the wage 
distribution which pushes down lower-tail inequality by reducing the ratio 
p50/p10 and drives up upper-tail inequality by enlarging the ration p90/p50. 
The middle thus loses out. For completeness the evolution of the inequality 
ratios by individual countries has been provided in the Appendix.    
The final part of the empirical analysis revolves around the evolution of 
wage dispersion according to the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) taxonomy. 
Splitting the sample for standardised hourly wages hw3w1us into the LMEs 
vs CMEs classification and looking at the evolution over time we can observe 
that wages in LMEs are much more dispersed than in CMEs. This is further 
evidence of LMEs harnessing market dynamics over the last three decades, 
while CMEs having institutional and political factors which constrain more 
the wage dynamics.  
Table 9: Evolution of standardised hourly wages hw3w1us in LMEs 
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Table 10: Evolution of standardised hourly wages hw3w1us in CMEs 
 
 
 
The aggregate picture is also reflected at the sectoral level as can be seen 
from the Tables below, with a dispersion that is present across all sectors. 
Table 11: Evolution of standardised hourly wages hw3w1us in LMEs by sector 
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Table 12: Evolution of standardised hourly wages hw3w1us in CMEs by sector 
 
In the Appendix a number of additional wage analyses have been provided 
to corroborate the evidence provided above, including inequality ratios 
across countries for upper Tail (90/50) and lower tail (50/10) inequality, wage 
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
1980 1990 2000 2010
1980 1990 2000 2010
1 2
3
hourly: country-specific calibration with imputation (lex) US$ Fitted values
year
Graphs by sector
0
5
0
1
0
0
1
5
0
0
5
0
1
0
0
1
5
0
1980 1990 2000 2010
1980 1990 2000 2010
1 2
3
hourly: country-specific calibration with imputation (lex) US$ Fitted values
year
Graphs by sector
167 
 
distributions USA vs EU, evolution of standardised hourly wages hw3w1us 
according to the Esping-Andersen taxonomy. 
We can reflect on a number of explanations for the patterns observed so far. 
In the US the polarisation pattern could have arised from a demand-led 
growth in cities as well as a major collapse in unionisation in the middle and 
a rise in demand for low service workers outweighting displaced routine 
workers. In the UK we could have experienced a similar pattern however 
supply side factors such as immigration and family policies increasing labour 
force particiation could have held wages down. In rest of the EU we could 
have seen immigration and lower demand-led growth in cities relatively to 
the US, coupled with still higher levels of unionisation, although the 
evidence in the paper does not seem to give credit to this interpretation and 
in part upgrading of several middle-skill jobs. It would for instance be 
important to have a further breakdown in manufacturing to understand how 
the composition of this category has shifted during the downgrading and 
upgrading processes. Also, understanding how EPL is associated with 
retraining/upgrading within CMEs and compared to LMEs would also refine 
further the findings above. Finally, a further distinction between permanent 
and temporary jobs and the wage coordination aspect should also become an 
element of the analysis.    
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6. Conclusions 
The main aim of this paper has been to investigate the effects on wage 
inequality of both secular trends of technological change, as evidenced by job 
polarization, as well as institution-based explanations. For this reason the 
operationalization has been threefold. Firstly it tried to unveil the wage 
dynamics and evolutions across sectors (defined as Less Knowledge 
Intensive Services, Manufacturing Industries and Knowledge Intensive 
Services) for the EU and the US over the last three decades. Looking at both 
hourly and monthly wages we can observe that the US exhibits a clear U-
shaped pattern with low-skilled services and high-skilled services growing 
considerably more than the middle sector, whereas no sign of wage 
polarization can be found in the EU: the wage dynamics show that the 
middle sector has not been hollowed out in terms of wage growth as in the 
case of the US. Secondly the analysis moved to delve deeper into these 
aggregate findings through a number of fixed effects regressions of upper-
tail (90/50) inequality and lower-tail (50/10) inequality. Based on the results 
from the previous papers, I first exploit employment protection legislation 
(EPL) and find that it reduce the 90/10 ratio while increasing the 50/10 ratio. 
This may be due to the fact that the higher strictness is associated with an 
increased difficulty for employers to fire workers in the middle of the 
employment distribution which reflects in their wage level being preserved. 
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EPL seems to increase the 50/10 ratio, although the effect is smaller in 
magnitude than for the upper-tail inequality where it has the opposite sign. 
Middle workers’ wages are thus preserved by the strictness in firing and 
probably by the diminished propensity to create temporary jobs at the lower 
end of the distribution which would likely translate into a decrease in p50. 
Job polarization is then used in following regressions (EPL is omitted since 
we found in Paper 1 that it is one of the regressors of job polarization). The 
results of the empirical specifications show that job polarization increases 
upper-tail inequality (90/50) while reducing lower-tail (50/10) inequality. The 
effect of job polarization is thus the one predicted by the literature, with a 
wage distribution which sees a reduction in the p50/p10 ratio and an increase 
in the p90/p50 ratio, however the contribution from the institutional 
component found above seems to be stronger than in the US case and thus 
the final patters are not U-shaped. Finally, the paper has tried to unveil wage 
dynamics over time according to the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) 
taxonomy. After splitting the sample for standardised hourly wages into the 
LMEs vs CMEs we can observe that wages in LMEs are much more 
dispersed than in CMEs and this pattern is preserved when looking at the 
evolution over time. LMEs are thus confirmed to harness market dynamics 
over the last three decades, while CMEs with a stronger institutional and 
political component have constrained more wage dynamics.  The findings in 
this paper therefore corroborate the framework by Lemieux(2008) and the 
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evidence he presented for the US by arguing that where wage-setting 
institutions are weak, a negative technological change depresses the wage 
growth in the sector where automation is stronger, instead where they are 
strong, wages in the middle remain stable despite the same negative demand 
change.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
Robots are hurting middle class workers and education won’t solve the problem 
Lawrence Summers, The Washington Post, March 2015 
 
 
This will be a major debate that I suspect will define a large part of the politics of the industrial world 
over the next decade. Little is certain. But we will do better going forward than backward. That means 
making America even greater, not great again. And it means embracing rather than rejecting 
technological progress. 
Lawrence Summers – ‘Robots are wealth creators and taxing them is illogical’  
Financial Times, March 2017 
 
 
 
The overarching objective of this thesis has been to investigate the political 
economy of job polarization developing it along three research fronts. The 
first paper extends the framework in Goos, Manning and Salomons(2014) by 
testing the joint effect of routinization and labour market institutions on 
employment structures in Europe. The evidence provided suggests that the 
claim of a pervasive technology-induced polarization should be revised in 
order to comprise a role for the institutional component. In particular, if job 
polarization operates through routinization, this effect is mitigated by 
employment protection legislation. On the other hand the interaction effect 
between routinization and trade unions and separately with minimum 
wages result not to be significant. My second research work finds that the job 
polarization experienced by a particular European country in the 5 years 
before a labour market reform instance is consistently among the strongest 
predictors of reform activity, as significant as other drivers such as GDP 
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growth and government net debt. Moreover, a higher degree of job 
polarization tends to be associated with an increase in deregulation and a 
decrease in the generosity of the policy measure. The empirical framework is 
also tested against more conventional taxonomies of welfare capitalism 
revealing that LMEs tend to harness job polarization dynamics whereas 
CMEs are incompatible with job polarization which destabilizes the system 
leading to an increased need for reforms. The final paper asks whether the U-
shaped impact on the wage distribution predicted by the job polarization 
literature has actually materialized in Europe. The findings in this paper 
show that job polarization increased upper-tail inequality (90/50) and 
decreased lower-tail (50/10) inequality but that employment protection 
legislation restrained these wage effects. Through a sectoral comparison I 
show that wage polarization is therefore a distinct pattern only for the US. 
Finally, by analysing wage dynamics I find that LMEs exhibit a much wider 
wage dispersion than CMEs and this is consistent over time. 
 
 
Main Results 
 
Paper I – Structural Employment Changes and the Disappearing Middle 
Class 
 
This first paper has investigated the evolution of employment patterns in the 
European labour markets over the period 1993-2011 and attempted to show 
that, although the routinization hypothesis remains the most plausible cause 
of job polarization, it is the peculiar type of institutional framework that 
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ultimately shapes the distinctive patterns that can be observed. It based its 
analysis on the European Labour Force Survey(EU LFS) and a number of 
other sources including the CEP-OECD Labour Market Institutions dataset 
and followed a methodology which resembles closely the one adopted by 
Goos, Manning and Salomons(2014). However, it further extended this 
framework by testing the joint effect of routinization and labour market 
institutions on employment structures. The results seem to go in the 
direction of labour market institutions, in particular employment protection 
legislation, constraining the effect of routinization and therefore delivering 
job polarization patterns which are heterogenous across countries, rather 
than a uniform phenomenon as evidenced by Goos et al. (2009, 2014).  
The hypothesis H1 of EPL insulating insiders which dampens down the 
routinization effect is confirmed by my results. Job polarization operates 
through routinization, but this effect is mitigated by employment protection 
legislation. A higher strictness of regulation on dismissals and on the use of 
temporary contracts thus constrains the job polarization patterns, and 
making the hollowing out of the labour market more subdued.  Hypothesis 
H2 of trade unions resisting technology-induced occupational changes is not 
verified. It may be that trade unions dampen the effect of firing within a firm, 
thus the slightly positive coefficient, however we could have entire firms 
going bankrupt because of automation therefore the interaction effect 
between routinization and trade unions becomes not significant. The last 
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hypothesis H3 of minimum wages constraining the growth of low skilled 
jobs is not confirmed either. Minimum Wages do not exert a significant effect 
on job polarization patterns when interacted with routinization. When 
adding the three labour market interactions together, the only significant 
interaction keeps being the one of employment protection legislation with 
routinization.  
 
Paper II – The Routinization of Labour Market Reforms  
This second research work explored whether job polarization has a 
feedback effect on labour market institutions and policies, so that 
different degrees of polarization lead to different articulations of 
institutions at the domestic level, thus reinforcing or altering 
differences in national models across the European space. This paper 
thus tries to establish whether there is a relationship between the 
extent of polarization exhibited by each European country and their 
specific labour market reform processes. The analysis finds that the job 
polarization experienced by a particular country in the 5 years before 
the reform instance is consistently among the strongest predictors of 
reform activity, as significant as other drivers such as GDP growth and 
government net debt. This means that the number of reforms is likely 
to be affected by the polarization pattern observed in the 5 years 
before, which underscores the persistence of such structural 
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employment changes. In other words an increased hollowing out of 
the labour market produces an increase in the number of reforms with 
a 5y window. Moreover a higher degree of job polarization tends to be 
associated with more deregulation and a decrease in the generosity of 
the policy measure. Finally when we apply the Varieties of Capitalism 
(VoC) classification we can see that the polarization index has a 
negative and significant magnitude, in other words increased 
polarization is indeed associated with less propensity to reform in 
LME countries. On the other hand for CMEs the sign of this variable is 
positive and significant: higher polarization leads to an increased 
number of reforms. This corroborates the hypotheses that LMEs are 
polarization consistent. These countries, by relying on flexibility, they 
harness market dynamics, thus accommodating changes brought by 
technological change. Whereas CMEs which are against big changes, 
especially in the middle of the occupational distribution, are confirmed 
to be polarization incompatible therefore job polarization destabilizes 
the system leading to an increased need for reforms. Job polarization 
leads to an erosion of welfare models through the weakening of the 
wage setting institutions which are meant to stabilize the system. It is 
thus interesting to highlight how job polarization seems also to lead to 
a possible convergence of CMEs towards LMEs, re-opening the age-
old debate between convergence and divergence (Kerr, Dunlop, 
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Fredeirck, Myers, 1960; Goldthorpe, 1984; Streeck & Thelen, 2005) and 
the more recent conceptualizations with the “dual convergence” thesis 
(Hay, 2004; Schekle, 2008).  
 
 
Paper III – Falling Behind: the Decoupling of Job and Wage Polarization in 
Europe 
Finally in my last paper I ask whether the coupling of job and wage 
polarization, which happened in the US throughout the period 1985-2005, 
has also occurred in Europe. However, while wage inequality has been on 
the rise also in Europe this U-shaped impact on the wage distribution 
predicted by the job polarization literature seems to have not materialized. 
The findings in this paper showed that job polarization increased upper-tail 
inequality (90/50) and decreased lower-tail (50/10) inequality but that 
employment protection legislation restrained these wage effects. This may be 
due to the fact that the higher strictness is associated with an increased 
difficulty for employers to fire workers in the middle of the employment 
distribution which reflects in their wage level being preserved. Job 
polarization is thus associated with a hollowing out of the middle and 
increases in employment growth at the low and high end of the distribution, 
as expected this translates into a corresponding effect in the wage 
distribution which pushes down lower-tail inequality by reducing the ratio 
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p50/p10 and drives up upper-tail inequality by enlarging the ration p90/p50, 
however EPL has a complete opposite countereffect which prevents wage 
polarization from occurring. The final part of the empirical analysis revolves 
around the evolution of wage dispersion according to the Varieties of 
Capitalism (VoC) taxonomy. Splitting the sample for standardised hourly 
wages hw3w1us into the LMEs vs CMEs classification and looking at the 
evolution over time we can observe that wages in LMEs are much more 
dispersed than in CMEs. This is further evidence of LMEs harnessing market 
dynamics over the last three decades, while CMEs having institutional and 
political factors which constrain more the wage dynamics.  
On the next page I summarise the key elements of this PhD thesis 
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  Paper One Paper Two Paper Three 
Q
u
es
ti
o
n
 
Research Puzzle If there is technological convergence among 
the European labour markets, because of 
routinization, why then do we still have 
different levels of job polarization across 
these countries?  
Does job polarization have a feedback effect 
on labour market institutions and policies, 
so that different degrees of polarization 
lead to different articulations of institutions 
at the domestic level, thus reinforcing or 
altering differences in national models 
across the European space? 
Has the U-shaped impact on the wage 
distribution predicted by the job literature 
materialized in Europe? 
Governing Question What is the role played by labour market 
institutions in explaining the diverging 
patterns of job polarization?   
What is the impact of job polarization on 
the likelihood and direction of labour 
market reforms? 
What are the effects on wage inequality of 
both secular trends of technological change, 
as evidenced by job polarization, as well as 
labour market institutions? 
S
et
u
p
 
Data EU LFS, UKLFS, EU-SILC, the Routing Task 
Intensity (RTI) index, the Princeton Data 
Improvement Initiative (PDII) dataset, and 
the CEP-OECD Institutions Dataset 
EU Commission LABREF dataset, fRDB-
IZA Social Policy Reforms Database, the 
construction of the Polarization Indices 
relies on employment growth measures 
from Paper One 
Occupational Wages around the World 
(OWW) Database, EU Commission Sectoral 
Classifications, Polarization Indices from 
Paper Two 
Empirical Methodology Regression analysis based on an extension 
of the model in Goos et al(2014) 
Probit regression model Analysis of wage dynamics and evolutions 
across sectors and over time, fixed effects 
regressions of wage inequality ratios 
R
es
u
lt
s 
Main findings EPL is shown to mitigate the effect of 
routinization, while trade unions and 
minimum wages do not seem to be 
significant in resisting technology-induced 
occupational changes 
The erosion of privileged interest 
representation and a weakened power of 
intermediation translate into a heightened 
intensity of labour market reforms and a 
higher degree of deregulation and 
decreased generosity of policy measures; 
LMEs are polarization consistent leading to 
a lower pressure to reform; CMEs are 
polarization incompatible leading to an 
increased reform activity 
No evidence of wage polarization in 
Europe.; EPL reduces upper-tail inequality 
(90/50) while maintaining or increasing 
lower-tail (50/10) inequality;  
job polarization increases upper-tail 
inequality (90/50) while reducing lower-tail 
(50/10) inequality 
C
o
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
 Scope/Type The claim of the labour economics literature 
of a pervasive technology-induced 
polarization should be revised in order to 
comprise a role for the institutional 
component 
Job polarization is consistently among the 
strongest determinants of reform activity. 
Findings shed further light on the debate on 
convergence among welfare regime types 
Results show that labour market 
institutions can play a major role in 
determining wage inequality patterns 
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Limitations  
A number of limitations have arisen while writing this thesis, here I will 
group them around three broad categories:  
Data Availability 
For a research work, which relies heavily on the occupational task 
framework, I think the most challenging aspect has been to find a satisfying 
match of the different occupational classifications. The breaks in the data and 
the several updates have made it difficult to match data not only across 
datasets (e.g. EULFS and ILO Earnings October Inquiries) but also within the 
same dataset (EULFS) across time. Additionally, reliance on existing 
crosswalk files has often resulted in mismeasurement errors and 
misclassifications, which protracted the data cleaning process. For Paper I, 
availability of employment data also before 1993 would certainly enrich my 
analysis given the different technological phases over the last three decades. 
For Paper II extending the construction of the polarization indices to the 
period before than 2000 would result in a major improvement and relevance 
of my findings. In Paper III, I wished offshoring could be used as an 
additional covariate in the determination of the wage inequality patterns.  
 
Measurement 
In Paper I, matching routinization and offshoring indices based on different 
occupational data has been a daunting task.  Moreover, it would be 
important to explore further the role of full-time versus part-time work. In 
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Paper 2, the construction of the polarization indices can probably be 
improved to explore more in detail the different types and how they link to 
the categories of welfare capitalism. In Paper III because of the mismatch 
between the occupational wage dataset and my routinization measures, 
routinization could not be used directly as a measure and job polarization 
was used instead. 
 
Empirical Methodology 
Several improvements could be carried out also on the methodological front. 
In Paper I could split the countries in high vs low EPL and see whether 
results are robust within these two subsamples. The same can be performed 
with high vs low routinization occupations. In Paper II the sample can also 
be split to understand whether the effect is driven by countries with initially 
very rigid labour market institutions or you can always be more flexible. An 
additional robustness check can be done with extensive margins, dummy for 
any reform and then do linear probability model and probit. For Paper III 
further robustness checks could include splitting the sample in high vs low 
epl and high vs low job polarization.  
 
Future Research Agenda and Tentative Policy Recommendations 
Moving now to possible future research avenues there are a number of 
considerations to be made. Among the forces driving the future of work – 
globalisation, demographic and environmental change – technological 
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disruption is manifesting itself as the most pervasive and impacting. In the 
transition of industrial nations to intensive knowledge economies, 
digitalisation is affecting not only the type of jobs needed, but also how, 
where and by whom they are carried out. The organisation of work, 
especially more recently with the gig and platform economy, has undergone 
substantial restructuring or re-orientation. Historical patterns and the 
economic literature have shown that technological change is disruptive but 
also brings about opportunities: it creates jobs directly but even more 
indirectly, makes jobs safer and more interesting with routine and manual 
tasks absorbed by automation. Hence are we going to be the inadvertent 
casualties of a technological collateral damage or will digitalisation have a 
multiplier effect on future employment?  My future research agenda builds 
on this thesis and aims to further understand how the European labour force 
is being transformed and redefined by technological progress. In particular it 
could have the following objectives: 
➢ Track changes to the occupational structure, task distribution and 
forms of work by extending the analysis to the EU28 
➢ Anticipate skill needs, identifying shortages and mismatch and follow 
the adaption of labour market institutions and policies to 
technological disruption through activation policies and 
apprenticeships 
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➢ Investigate how to promote quality jobs in a larger policy context 
which takes into account productivity growth, trade, spending and 
social policies   
Also from a policy perspective, this study could try to move beyond the main 
responses to technological disruption given until now across the private and 
public spheres, such as: 
o educational upgrading, however, when disruption affects also white 
collar jobs, this solution has severe limitations and can only be part of 
the answer; 
o redistributive policies, proposals of taxation for winner-take-all 
technologies or the introduction of a universal basic income which 
face severe political obstacles; 
and can try to explore a “third way to technological disruption”: 
o technological adoption and diffusion units, governments to set up an ad-
hoc infrastructure to embrace technological change and adopt policies 
to fully integrate the immigrants from the future (i.e. robots). Early 
signs of this are currently being put forward by Japan. 
Risks being addressed  
• How many jobs are really at risk going forward? 
• Are labour market and social risks shifting to workers? And do they 
have the skills for the new and changing jobs? 
• Are the current employment relations and social contracts adequate to 
the evolving forms of work? 
• Are labour markets as well as tax and benefit systems pro-actively 
responding to the opportunities and challenges of digitalisation?  
• To what extent is the redefinition of work affecting the sustainability 
of public and private welfare systems across countries and industries? 
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As highlighted by recent OECD studies most of the studies carried out in the 
field of technological disruption assume all jobs within an occupation are the 
same and all occupations across countries are the same. However it is more 
appropriate to analyse the task content of each job and not the average tasks of each 
occupation. The Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) offers this possibility and it is 
my intention to make full use of this in order to track changes to the 
occupational structure and forms of work in the EU28.  
Moreover, it has been pointed out that tasks and jobs can be automated only 
when there is technological adoption and diffusion. It is therefore crucial 
when discussing job destruction to account for jobs that are created directly and 
indirectly. Also jobs themselves change, hence some precautions have to be 
taken when interpreting results from previous studies. My research aims to 
look at these important patterns and investigate which are the possibilities to 
compensate any lower demand for labour.  
The most innovative component of my future research agenda could be that 
through the combination of the datasets presented above it tries to address 
the question of technology being labour replacing or labour augmenting by 
overcoming the limitations of several studies in the economic literature 
which do not distinguish the new forms of independent work or do not take 
into account the evolution of the definition of work.  
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Additionally, this study could investigate and advance proposals to address 
the rising economic and social patterns that are emerging among workers in 
non-standard work arrangements:  
- Less access to social protection and worker rights 
- Less access to training  
- Weaker career progression 
- Limited access to credit and insurance coverage 
 
As Manning (2011) observes “wage inequality and job polarization show that 
it is time to be pursuing redistribution from the highest-earners to those with 
middle and lower incomes”. Manning’s key observation is that, while in the 
last three decades the very richest have seen their incomes significantly pull 
away from those on low and middle incomes, this phenomenon has not been 
matched by an increase in the public’s desire to see incomes redistributed by 
the government. While the level of public distrust for government 
interventionism in this area is significant and meaningful, we need to think 
harder about solutions to income inequalities. My research has shown that 
trade unions in their current form and minimum wages have been slightly 
ineffective at addressing the transformational consequences of phenomena 
such as job polarization, but there is certainly a role for labour market 
institutions to be played. Rethinking wage setting systems and updating 
employment protection legislations could be the way forward in tackling the 
future occupational challenges.  
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Appendix 
Paper I Appendix 
TableA1: Bargaining coverage, wage inequality, and temporary employment 
in the 1990s–2000s  
 
Sources: Oesch (2013) - Collective bargaining: Visser (2007); wage inequality, temporary 
employment: OECD, various years 
 
TableA2: Relative wages and job creation in the quintile 1 
 
Source: Oesch (2013) Note: Dataset for Denmark (EU-LFS) does not include earnings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Collective Bargaining:
% of Workers Covered
Lower-tail Wage Inequality:
Wage at Decile 5/wage at Decile 1
Temporary Employmet as % of
Total Dependent Employment
Early 1990s Early 2000s 1990 2000 2005 1990 2000 2008
Britain 47 35 1.78 1.81 1.84 5 7 5
Denmark 73 76 1.38 1.47 1.53 11 10 9
Germany 70 60 1.44 1.54 1.63 11 13 15
Spain 70 80 1.95 1.64 1.67 30 32 29
Switzerland 50 50 1.51 1.49 1.47 … 12 13
Median Wage of Quintile 1 as % of 
Overall Median Wage
Absolute Job Growth in 
Quintile 1, 1990-2008 (in %)
Absolute Job Growth in 
Interpersonal Service Jobs, 
1990-2008 (in %)
Britain 65 (1993) 15 47
Denmark - (9) 3
Germany 78 (1990) (12) 0
Spain 68 (1989/90) 19 108
Switzerland 73 (1991) (9) 9
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The following provides details for a measure which was not included in the main 
analyses but was used as an additional institutional variable:  
co_oecd: This is an index of bargaining coordination with range {1,5} taken from 
OECD (2004), Table 3.5. It is increasing in the degree of coordination in the 
bargaining process on the employers’ as well as the unions’ side.  
1 = Fragmented company/plant bargaining, little or no coordination 
by upper-level associates. 
2 = Fragmented industry and company level bargaining, with little or 
no pattern-setting. 
3 = Industry level bargaining with irregular pattern-setting and 
moderate coordination among major bargaining actors. 
4 = a) Informal coordination of industry and firm-level bargaining by 
peak associations; 
b) Coordinated bargaining by peak confederations, including 
government-sponsored negotiations or government imposition of 
wage schedules; 
c) Regular pattern-setting coupled with high union concentration 
and/or bargaining coordination by large firms; 
        d) Government wage arbitration. 
5 = a) Informal coordination of industry-level bargaining by an 
encompassing union confederation; 
b) Coordinated bargaining by peak confederations or government 
imposition of a wage schedule/freeze, with a peace obligation. 
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Paper II Appendix 
Bargaining framework at the firm level 
A number of models have looked at how different labour market institutions 
– for instance employment protection versus flexicurity – affect technology 
adoption in unionised firms. Lommerud and Straume (2007) carry out an 
analysis cast in a setting of corporate globalisation, where domestic 
unionised labour face the double threat of labour-saving technological 
innovations and international outsourcing of domestic production. They look 
mainly at trade unions’ incentives to oppose or endorse the adoption of new 
technology.  
However, it is much less common to look at the other direction of causality: 
the impact of technological innovation on the balance of power between 
employers and trade unions, that is likely to affect also the type of labour 
market reform implemented in a particular country. 
The relationship between large employers and trade unions cannot be 
assessed through a standard competition framework in which wages are 
determined just by looking at the interplay of supply and demand. Wages as 
well as other elements are determined instead through a bilateral negotiation 
process, where the final outcome of this process depends on both parties’ 
inside and outside options. In particular, inside options are the alternatives 
that both parties have in case of a temporary breakdown in negotiations. One 
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outside option for employers in our bargaining framework can be the 
introduction and the ability to quickly implement a new technology, which 
effectively replaces the workers represented by a trade union. If the 
implementation of such a technology is more cost effective for the employer 
in question than the cost of training of his employees this will likely cause a 
change in the value of this outside option. The technological innovation 
under certain conditions may also represent an independent choice (labour 
augmenting), however in this framework it will more likely constitute ‘the 
outside option’ to which the employer will resort in order to obtain higher 
profits.  
Elabourating on our simplified framework: initially neither the trade unions 
nor the employers appear to be price takers, in the sense that they must 
accept a price set by the other party. This means that neither of the two 
appears to be in a position to make “take it or leave it offers”. Economic 
principles suggest that in a bilateral bargaining context the bargaining 
outcome (for example wages) depends on the alternatives (so called outside 
options) available to both negotiating parties. Typically an agreement is 
reached if both parties receive some financial benefit above and beyond their 
outside options. We refer to this financial benefit as a party’s share of the 
bargaining surplus. Outside options are the best alternative profits the 
parties can earn in the event of a temporary or permanent breakdown in 
negotiations. 
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Given the dependence of the bargaining outcome on parties’ outside options, 
all else equal, the less (more) attractive a employer’s outside option, the 
higher (lower) will be the negotiated wage. A similar but reverse relationship 
holds for trade union —it will receive a higher (lower) wage the more (less) 
attractive its outside option. 
A schematic visualisation of the bargaining framework can be provided by 
the following: 
UE = DE + bE (V – DTU – DE)    (1) 
Equation 1 represents the profit U for the employer. DE represents the outside 
option (in our case technology). bE is the share of the net surplus whereas V is 
the gross surplus and DTU is the profit of the next best alternative for the trade 
union.  
We will rearrange equation 1 in order to allow an analysis of the impact of a 
change in the employer’s outside option on the bargaining outcome “all else 
equal” 
UE = bE (V – DTU)  + bTU DE         (2) 
We then consider a change in the employer’s outside option, denoted by  
ΔDE with all the parameters unchanged. The resulting change in the 
employer’s profit (denoted by ΔUE) is given by:  
ΔUE = bTU (ΔDE)         (3) 
Equation 3 shows that without knowledge of the parameter bTU (that being 
the trade union’s share of the net surplus) one cannot conclude whether an 
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all else equal change in the employer’s outside option would have a large, 
small (or indeed any) effect on the bargaining outcome . 
The simplified framework above aims at studying indirectly the diminishing 
bargaining power that trade unions may have when it comes to negotiating 
wages for workers whose tasks can be replaced by the introduction of a new 
technology. Although in a simplistic way, it looks at the shifting balance of 
power as a technological innovation becomes available.  
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Table VarCap  - de5 
    (1) (2) 
 
LME CME 
      
gdp growth 0.106 -0.0544 
 
(0.0992) (0.0498) 
log of per capita gdp 0.00127*** -0.000105 
 
(0.000486) (0.000115) 
government net debt 0.305** -0.00824 
 
(0.136) (0.00937) 
unemployment rate -0.990** 0.0902 
 
(0.478) (0.0782) 
inflation -0.646** -0.116 
 
(0.272) (0.0835) 
trade openess 0.0393 0.00804 
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(0.0418) (0.0165) 
polarization index (de5) -0.955** 0.0490 
 
(0.433) (0.0662) 
Constant -58.98** 6.034 
 
(23.40) (5.133) 
Observations 23 73 
Standard errors in 
parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
The fRDB-IZA Social Policy Reforms Database 
This database has been created as a joint initiative of Fondazione Rodolfo De 
Benedetti and IZA (Institute for the Study of Labour, Bonn) to collect an 
inventory on core labour market reforms. It collects information about social 
reforms in the EU15 countries (except Luxembourg) over the period 1980-
2007.   
The table that follows helps to have a better understanding of the 
categorization of the reforms in the database. Two dimensions are 
considered: size, which can be either discrete or incremental, and scope if it 
affects only part of the working population (two-tier) or if it is complete.  
Share of Manufacturing  
The figures for manufacturing as employment share in total economy instead 
are derived from the OECD-STAN Database which provides annual 
indicators related to production and employment structure, labour 
productivity and labour costs, investment, business research and 
development expenditures and international trade patterns. The data we will 
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use refers only to 15 EU countries and covers the time-period 1980-
2007, although the time coverage may vary across countries and indicators. 
 
Polarization Indices – Construction (de, ind, pol) 
As can be observed from the visualizations below, the t-stat ratio of rank and 
rank^2 will provide the de index. Whereas ind will further categorise the type 
of polarization and pol will also consider the significance of this estimation.  
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Polarization index - de – Kernel density estimates  
de3  Whole sample 
 
Individual countries 
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de5  Whole sample 
 
Individual countries 
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de7  Whole sample 
 
Individual countries 
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de10  Whole sample 
 
Individual countries 
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Paper III Appendix 
Inequality ratios – Upper Tail (90/50) and Lower tail (50/10) 
  
  
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1980 1990 2000 2010
USA - log monthly wage 
ratio
90/50 50/10
1.12
1.14
1.16
1.18
1.2
1.22
1.24
1.26
1.28
1980 1990 2000 2010
USA - log hourly wage 
ratio
90/50 50/10
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.1
1.11
1980 1990 2000 2010
EU - log monthly wage 
ratio
90/50 50/10
1.15
1.2
1.25
1.3
1.35
1.4
1.45
1.5
1980 1990 2000 2010
EU - log hourly wage ratio
90/50 50/10
199 
 
  
  
  
1.02
1.04
1.06
1.08
1.1
1.12
1980 1990 2000 2010
UK- log monthly wage 
ratio
90/50 50/10
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1980 1990 2000 2010
UK- log hourly wage ratio
90/50 50/10
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1980 1990 2000 2010
IT- log hourly wage ratio
90/50 50/10
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1980 1990 2000 2010
IT- log hourly wage ratio
90/50 50/10
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.1
1.11
1980 1990 2000 2010
DE - log monthly wage 
ratio
90/50 50/10
1.1
1.15
1.2
1.25
1.3
1.35
1.4
1980 1990 2000 2010
DE- log hourly wage ratio
90/50 50/10
200 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.015
1.02
1.025
1.03
1.035
1.04
1.045
1.05
1.055
1.06
1980 1990 2000 2010
FI - log monthly wage ratio
90/50 50/10
1.06
1.08
1.1
1.12
1.14
1.16
1.18
1.2
1980 1990 2000 2010
FI - log hourly wage ratio
90/50 50/10
1.005
1.01
1.015
1.02
1.025
1.03
1.035
1.04
1.045
1.05
1980 1990 2000 2010
NO - log monthly wage 
ratio
90/50 50/10
1.02
1.04
1.06
1.08
1.1
1.12
1.14
1.16
1.18
1.2
1.22
1980 1990 2000 2010
NO - log hourly wage ratio
90/50 50/10
201 
 
Wage distributions USA 
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Wage distributions EU 
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Evolution of standardised hourly wages hw3w1us according to the Esping-
Andersen taxonomy 
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